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Congress and the Independence
of Federal Law Enforcement
Andrew Kent*
Not since the Nixon presidency has the issue of the professional
neutrality and independence of federal law enforcement from White House
interference or misuse been such a pressing issue. This Article describes
the problem, details Congress’s important role in responding to it during
the 1970s, and makes specific recommendations for Congress today. As
important background, this Article recounts the abuses of the Hoover era
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and the ways the Nixon
White House sought to both impede and corrupt the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and the FBI. It then describes what an engaged Congress looked
like — the Congress of the 1970s — when it reacted to these abuses by
helping to develop laws, structures, and norms of law enforcement
independence and neutrality that served this country well for two
generations. Drawing both on ideas floated in Congress post-Watergate,
as well as institutional design features from independent regulatory
agencies, this Article then suggests a menu of options for a future
Congress, if it could move beyond gridlock and partisanship, to engage
again with pressing issues about the White House’s relationship to federal
law enforcement. Most options I survey here are constitutionally
uncontroversial. But two options, both of which were proposed by
reformist senators soon after Watergate, are more aggressive and
constitutionally problematic: statutory qualifications limiting the range of
appointees for senior DOJ roles, and a statutory for-cause restriction on
the President’s ability to remove the FBI Director. After setting out
arguments for the constitutionality of these proposals, I conclude with a
menu of concrete policy recommendations for a future Congress that
wishes to get off the sidelines and again play a constructive role in
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protecting the country from the abuse of our powerful and essential federal
law enforcement institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement infected by political or personal agendas is, or
should be, the stuff of our nightmares. Any reasonable conception of
the rule of law requires that law be applied impartially and
impersonally.1 As the influential Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
put it, the ideal is “impartial . . . administration of justice,” and “a
government of laws and not of men.”2 Today, the mission statement of
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “Justice Department”)
promises “to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice.”3 In
perhaps the most famous distillation of prosecutorial ethics, Attorney
General Robert Jackson — later Justice Jackson — warned against “the
most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that
he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be
prosecuted.”4 Law enforcement would then be simply “picking the
man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to
work, to pin some offense on him.”5 “Picking the man” (or woman, or
group) for personal, political, ideological, racial, or other invidious
reasons, and then searching for a criminal charge to bring, is a favorite
tool of all tyrannies.
For the past two generations, the United States has had a good —
not perfect, but good — record at the federal level of avoiding this
fate. Two important judicial institutions — federal courts staffed by
judges with tenure during good behavior, and juries of citizens6 —
have helped prevent the misuse of law federal enforcement. But given
the amount of discretion that escapes external review during the
investigative and prosecutorial stages, the executive branch itself must
be structured, staffed, and led in ways that promote fair and impartial
law enforcement.
1 See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 22,
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/.
2 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, arts. XXIX, XXX.
3 About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Nov. 2,
2018).
4 Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen., Address at the Second Annual Conference of
U.S. Attorneys: The Federal Prosecutor 4 (Apr. 1, 1940), www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/16/04-01-1940.pdf.
5 Id. at 5.
6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
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Especially in the last forty years, the most important federal law
enforcement organizations, the DOJ and its components, the U.S.
Attorneys’ offices and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or
“Bureau”), have developed very strong cultures stressing
professionalism, fairness, impartiality, and nonpartisanship. A key part
of ensuring that federal law enforcement is not tyrannical has been
removing as far as possible the influence of political actors on the
investigation and prosecution of specific cases.7 Thus independence,
professionalism, and impartiality have been tightly linked.8 In the
post-Watergate era, both Congress and the executive branch have
played key roles in establishing and buttressing professionalism and
impartiality by bolstering independence from the White House.
But independence of federal law enforcement from political control
has never been absolute, and there has been wide agreement that it
should not be. Ever since 1789, the U.S. Attorney General and U.S.
Attorneys (the top federal prosecutor in each judicial district) have
been appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, without statutory limits on removal from office.9 The director
of the FBI has also been an at-will employee, serving at the pleasure of
the President.10
Some substantial degree of direct presidential control over the heads
of the DOJ and the FBI has generally been thought to be required by
the Constitution. Law enforcement is mentioned expressly in Article
7 See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal”
and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 187-89 (2008)
(discussing the discharge of eight U.S. Attorneys in order to further the President’s
partisan agenda).
8 See infra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
9 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92; see also, e.g., 1 S. EXEC.
JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 29-32 (1789) (recording the Senate acting upon
nominations for district attorney by President Washington). The creation of the DOJ
in 1870, with the Attorney General at its head, did not change this. See Act to
Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). Into the
twentieth century, U.S. Attorneys were referred to as district attorneys or federal
district attorneys.
10 It was not until 1966 that Congress specified that the Attorney General had the
power to appoint the FBI Director. See Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 378, 616
(1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2018)). Two years later, Congress gave the
appointment to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but said
nothing about removal, leaving the director an at-will employee. See Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1101, 82 Stat. 197, 236
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 532 note (2018)). Legislation in 1976 fixing the director’s term
at a non-renewable ten years did not speak to removal. See Crime Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-503, tit. II, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 532 note
(2018)).
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II, which enjoins the President to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”11 and vests “the executive Power” in the
President.12 Both provisions place law execution power in “the
president,” not in any other institution or individual,13 but Article II
also envisions a hierarchical structure with the President at the top,
executing the laws and protecting the national security through
subordinate officers and departments.14 It is assumed that the power
and duty to execute must include an authority to investigate violations
of the laws and to prosecute violations, civilly and criminally.15 By the
Article II oath and the Take Care Clause, the President is bound to
“faithfully execute” the office and the laws.16 New research suggests
that the original meaning of these twin commands requires the
President, among other things, to act in a diligent, careful, good faith,
and impartial manner when executing the laws, for public-spirited
rather than self-interested or corrupt purposes.17
The primary law enforcement institutions and actors — the
Attorney General, DOJ attorneys, the FBI Director, and Bureau
employees — also have important national security roles,18 and the
11

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
13 E.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499
(2010) (“The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation
oversee the execution of the laws.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997)
(“The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws
enacted by Congress.”).
14 The President shall nominate, and with the Senate’s advice and consent appoint,
the principal “Officers of the United States,” and if Congress so provides, appoint
“inferior Officers,” with or without Senate concurrence. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
The President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (describing
criminal prosecution as “a core executive constitutional function”); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the functions
performed by the independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within the
Executive Branch.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (stating that the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal and civil cases is a constitutional
power of the President); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-40 (1976) (stating that
“conducting civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public
rights” is a presidential prerogative under Article II).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 3.
17 See Andrew Kent et al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3260593.
18 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended
by Exec. Order No. 13,284 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355 (2004); and Exec. Order
12
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President has very significant constitutional power to conduct the
nation’s foreign affairs and protect the national security, personally
and through at-will subordinates.19 Notwithstanding — or because of
— all of this presidential power, Congress is given authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to implement — and hence regulate —
the powers vested in the President and in the United States
government as a whole.20
But many specific questions remain unanswered by the
constitutional text itself, including: Is some independence of law
enforcement from presidential control constitutionally permissible? If
so, how much, and what kind? Is some independence constitutionally
mandatory? These and related questions were uncertain and
controversial in 1789 and remain so today.
A. Post-Watergate Norms of Law Enforcement Independence
Reflecting constitutional uncertainties, it is difficult to precisely
define the proper role for political oversight of federal law
enforcement. Even very experienced and sophisticated commentators
can fall back on generalities.21 But the scandals and debates of the
Watergate era helped crystallize more specific ideas. Both the negative
examples set by men like J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon, and the
positive, reformist efforts by Congress, the press, civil society groups,
post-Nixon Presidents, and law enforcement leaders, generated more
precise guidelines or norms that have attracted widespread and lasting
agreement. Some of these guidelines have been partially embodied in
law or executive branch orders. Others are norms or conventions that
have become widely accepted among political and legal elites.22
Although it could be supplemented, I think the following list of
guidelines captures many widely-shared views about the presidency
No. 13,470 (2008).
19 See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982); Chi. & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
21 See, e.g., ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 27 (1976) (contrasting the
“proper role of the political process in the shaping of legal policies and the perversion
of the legal process by political pressure”); Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the
Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing on S.
110-10 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter
Preserving Prosecutorial Independence] (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (stating
that federal prosecutors “must be seen to enforce the rule of law without fear or favor”
and must be “apolitical”).
22 On the definition of norms or conventions, see infra notes 53–56 and
accompanying text.
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and federal law enforcement that crystallized in the 1970s. First, the
politically-accountable head of the executive branch — the President
— can and indeed should set out the broad parameters of legal and
enforcement policy for DOJ prosecutors and law enforcement agencies
like the FBI, because ultimately the President is accountable for the
faithful execution of the law.23 The Attorney General’s job involves
such a large element of sensitive policy — in areas ranging from civil
litigation against the government to federal prison administration to
immigration to law enforcement priorities — that he or she is properly
an at-will employee of the President, and hence responsive to the
public will as well.24 The FBI Director should be much more insulated
23 See, e.g., Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803
and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 87 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics Hearing] (statement of
Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen.) (“The people of this country are concerned
properly about matters such as organized crime, civil rights, pornography, the death
penalty, and enforcement of the antitrust laws. These and other areas are legitimate
issues of public debate and legitimate issues in a Presidential campaign. The President
should be able to set broad priorities in these and related areas.”). For other
expressions of this norm, see id. at 17-18 (statement of Hon. Theodore C. Sorenson,
Former Special Counsel to President Kennedy); id. at 202 (statement of Archibald
Cox, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University, and former Special Prosecutor in
the Department of Justice); AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY FED. LAW ENF’T
AGENCIES, PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
37 (1976) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential
Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 838-39 (2015); Griffin B. Bell.,
Attorney Gen., Address Before Department of Justice Lawyers 4-5 (Sept. 6, 1978),
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf [hereinafter
Bell Address].
24 See, e.g., Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 18 (statement of Hon.
Theodore C. Sorenson) (“[The Attorney General] not only enforces Federal law,
investigates its violations, and prosecutes its violators, but also interprets it for the
President and other agency heads, represents the government in civil as well as
criminal cases, offers recommendations and reactions to the executive branch, drafts,
presents, and reviews legislation, and is concerned with prisons, pardons, paroles,
narcotics, juvenile delinquency, immigration, community relations, domestic security,
and judicial vacancies.”). For other expressions of this norm, see id. at 152-53, 157
(statement of Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Att’y Gen.); ABA REPORT, supra
note 23, at 33-34, 37; JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY: TRUTH, LIES, AND LEADERSHIP
106 (2018); Dahlia Lithwick & Jack Goldsmith, Politics as Usual: Why the Justice
Department Will Never Be Apolitical, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2007, 6:46 PM),
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/politics_as_usual.ht
ml. For codification of this norm, see 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2018) (allowing the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the Attorney General, and
neither stating a term of office nor placing restrictions on removal). Support for this
norm can also be seen when reforms of the DOJ to protect independence and
impartiality are proposed, but without any suggestion that the Attorney General
should be anything but an at-will employee of the President. See, e.g., NAT’L TASK
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from political control than the Attorney General, operating as
independently as possible, but nevertheless “responsive[] to the broad
policies of the Executive Branch.”25 Partisan political considerations,
personal vendettas or favoritism, financial gain, or self-protection or
self-dealing should play no role in investigating or prosecuting cases,
hiring or firing career officials, prosecutors, and law enforcement
agents, and U.S. Attorneys and FBI Directors.26 The senior leadership

FORCE ON RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 2-3 (2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/TaskForceReport_2018
_09_.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L TASK FORCE]; Roadmap for Renewal: Congressional
Oversight and Legislation to Renew Our Democracy, PROTECT DEMOCRACY,
https://protectdemocracy.org/roadmap-for-renewal/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
25 TEN-YEAR TERM FOR THE FBI DIRECTOR, S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 2 (1974); see also
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing on S. 107-514 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 87 (2001) [hereinafter Mueller Hearing] (statement of Robert S.
Mueller, III) (stating that the FBI must be “independent, to pursue its investigations
without any favor to one political party or the other or to any particular individual, no
matter how powerful” but that the director should be responsive to the Attorney
General on “policy matters.”); Nomination of Judge William Steele Sessions to be
Director of the FBI: Hearing on S. 100-36 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 10 (1987) [hereinafter Hon. William Sessions Hearing] (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(stating that an FBI Director has to “walk that fine line between responding to the
Nation’s political leaders and pursuing the department’s very independent law
enforcement mission.”); LOUIS J. FREEH, MY FBI: BRINGING DOWN THE MAFIA,
INVESTIGATING BILL CLINTON, AND FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERROR 38 (2005) (“Integrity
and independence make or break an FBI Director. The incumbent has to be able to say
no to the attorney general or even the president if no is the right answer.”); Daphna
Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2207-14 (2018). For
partial codification of this norm, see Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503,
§ 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 532 note (2018)) (giving the FBI
Director a ten-year term, chosen because it extended beyond any one President’s time
in office).
26 For general statements of this norm, see, for example, Preserving Prosecutorial
Independence, supra note 21; Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 15-16
(statement of Hon. Theodore C. Sorenson); id. at 88 (statement of Robert Dixon); id.
at 154 (statement of Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at
44; NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 2; Bell Address, supra note 23, at 2-3. For
partial codifications of this norm, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION § 9-27.260, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principlesfederal-prosecution (“In determining whether to commence or recommend
prosecution or take other action against a person, the attorney for the government
should not be influenced by: 1) The person’s race, religion, gender, ethnicity, national
origin, sexual orientation, or political association, activities, or beliefs; 2) The
attorney’s own personal feelings concerning the person, the person’s associates, or the
victim; or 3) The possible affect [sic] of the decision on the attorney’s own
professional or personal circumstances.”).
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of the DOJ should take no part in political campaigns.27 The DOJ and
FBI should never be used by the White House for partisan political
information gathering or other personally-motivated operations.28
Decisions about specific investigatory or prosecutorial steps in
particular criminal cases are almost always best left to career officials
operating free from political intervention, and supervised by political
appointees based only on “law and merit” rather than improper
considerations including “White House approval or influence.”29
Investigations and prosecutions of senior White House or DOJ officials
should be conducted so as to minimize conflicts of interest and the
appearance of or actual improper interference.30 And a President,
27 See Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 59-60 (statement of Hon. Arthur
J. Goldberg, former J., United States Supreme Court); id. at 170 (statement of Hon.
Ramsey Clark, former Att’y Gen.); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 41; NAT’L ACAD. OF
PUB. ADMIN., WATERGATE: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 160-61
(1974) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADEMY REPORT]; Jackson, supra note 4, at 3-4.
28 See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 40947 (1973) (statement of Sen. Ervin); id. at 11351
(statement of Sen. Byrd); id. at 14130 (statement of Sen. Schweiker); Bell Address,
supra note 23, at 3. See generally FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MANUAL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES, pt. 1, § 1-18.3.2 (“The FBI, like all law
enforcement agencies, must be perceived by the public as nonpartisan and
apolitical.”).
29 Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 16 (statement of Theodore C.
Sorenson); see also Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017) (“For good reason, particular criminal
matters are not directed by the President personally but are handled by career
prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the public and
promoting public safety. The President does not and should not decide who or what
to investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen.”);
Madeline Conway, Key Moments from Wray’s FBI Confirmation Hearing, POLITICO (July
12, 2017, 11:31 AM EDT), www.politico.com/story/2017/07/12/christopher-wrayconfirmation-hearing-key-moments-240452 (quoting Christopher Wray, nominee for
FBI Director, stating at his confirmation hearing that “there certainly shouldn’t be any
discussion between, one-on-one discussion between, the FBI Director and any
president about how to conduct particular investigations or cases”). For other
statements of this norm, see Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 21
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen.); Removing Politics Hearing, supra
note 23, at 154 (statement of Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); id. at 168-69
(statement of Ramsey Clark); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 69-73; COMEY, supra note
24, at 120, 179, 237, 246; NAT’L ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 27, at 160-61; Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2357-58 (2001); Barkow,
supra note 23, at 833-34, 838; Bell Address, supra note 23, at 4-5; Jackson, supra note
4, at 2. For suggestions that Congress in 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547 (2018) has codified the
rule that the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys, rather than the President or the
White House, direct criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464-65 (1996) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693-94 (1974).
30 See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 601,
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acting either directly or through aides, violates his oath of office and
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law if he seeks to obstruct
or defeat duly authorized law enforcement inquiries into his own
behavior or that of close associates.31
This post-Watergate elite consensus on principles of federal law
enforcement independence and neutrality has endured through the
present day, but is now under pressure. Among the many aspects of
the candidacy and presidency of Donald Trump that have attracted
widespread condemnation are his repeated attacks on this consensus.
Starting from his time as a candidate, Trump has engaged in
unprecedented and often highly personal attacks on the integrity,
competence, and independence of the FBI, DOJ, FBI Directors, and
Attorneys General.32 Starting soon upon taking office, Trump
repeatedly pressured Attorney General Jefferson Sessions and three
FBI Directors in highly inappropriate ways.33 Trump fired FBI Director
92 Stat. 1824 (creating the process for appointing and monitoring an independent
counsel).
31 See, e.g., AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT ADOPTED BY THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, art. I (1974),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/articles-impeachment-adopted-thehouse-representatives-committee-the-judiciary; Law Professor Letter on President’s
Article II Powers, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (June 4, 2018), https://protectdemocracy.org/
law-professor-article-ii/.
32 Some of the voluminous evidence supporting this statement is compiled in
NOAH BOOKBINDER ET AL., CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, THE
MOST UNETHICAL PRESIDENCY: YEAR ONE 11-12 (2018); Sharon LaFraniere et al.,
Trump’s Unparalleled War on a Pillar of Society: Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/us/politics/trump-fbi-justice.html.
33 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Philip Rucker, Tensions Swell Between Sessions and
FBI over Senior Personnel from Comey Era, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tensions-between-sessionsand-fbi-over-senior-personnel-from-comey-era/2018/01/22/c95fc2bc-ffeb-11e7-8acfad2991367d9d_story.html?utm_term=.fbe5acc14b35 (“FBI Director Christopher A.
Wray has been resisting pressure from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to replace the
bureau’s deputy director, Andrew McCabe, a frequent target of criticism from
President Trump.”); Stephen Collinson et al., James Comey Testimony: Trump Asked
Me to Let Flynn Investigation Go, CNN (June 8, 2017, 1:54 AM ET),
cnn.com/2017/06/07/politics/james-comey-testimony-released/index.html (reporting
former FBI Director James Comey’s testimony to Congress that President Trump
asked Comey for personal loyalty and soon afterwards asked him to drop an FBI
investigation of Trump campaign advisor and former Trump national security adviser
Michael Flynn); Ellen Nakashima et al., Trump Asked the Acting FBI Director How He
Voted During Oval Office Meeting, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-asked-the-acting-fbi-directorwhom-he-voted-for-during-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/23/2cb50818-0073-11e8-8acfad2991367d9d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dae51fbc5762 (reporting that
soon after Andrew McCabe became acting director of the FBI, Trump called McCabe
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James Comey in an attempt to stop an investigation of Trump’s
campaign associates for possible collusion with Russia.34 Trump
pressured Attorney General Sessions to resign because Sessions
followed the advice of career ethics officials at the DOJ and recused
from the Russia-Trump probe, rather than stay in place and use his
office to protect the President, his family, and associates.35 Sessions
did in fact resign at the request of President Trump on November 7,
2018.36 And President Trump also repeatedly pressed the DOJ and the
FBI to criminally investigate his campaign opponent, Hillary Clinton.
Trump’s announced view is that federal law enforcement should
answer directly to him, protect him personally, and advance his
personal and political agendas.37
The responses by the 115th Congress to this norm flouting by the
chief executive were minimal. After firing Comey, apparently for selfto the Oval Office, asked him for whom he had voted in the presidential election, and
“vented his anger at McCabe” about his wife’s receipt of campaign money from a
Clinton-connected governor during her 2015 race for a Virginia state legislative seat).
34 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians that Firing “Nut Job” Comey Eased
Pressure from Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html (reporting that Trump told the Russian
ambassador in a White House meeting: “I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a
real nut job . . . . I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.”); Devlin Barrett
& Philip Rucker, Trump Said He Was Thinking of Russia Controversy When He Decided to
Fire Comey, WASH. POST (May 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/trump-says-fbi-director-comey-told-him-three-times-he-wasnt-underinvestigation-once-in-a-phone-call-initiated-by-the-president/2017/05/11/2b384c9a-366911e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.4f5e0a07623b (reporting that President
Trump said during a televised interview that he was “thinking of” the FBI’s pending
investigation of connections between the Trump campaign and Russian government
interference with the presidential election when he fired FBI Director Comey).
35 See, e.g., Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions is Forced Out as Attorney General as
Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/
07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [hereinafter Jeff Sessions is Forced Out].
36 Resignation Letter from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to Donald J. Trump, President
(Nov. 7, 2018, 4:08 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/sessionsresignation-letter/index.html.
37 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes
U.S. “Look Very Bad,” N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-mueller-russia-china-north-korea.html
(Trump
stated: “I have [the] absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”);
see also Peter Baker, “Very Frustrated” Trump Becomes Top Critic of Law Enforcement, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/us/politics/trump-says-justicedept-and-fbi-must-do-what-is-right-and-investigate-democrats.html (Trump said, “You
know, the saddest thing is that because I’m the president of the United States, I am not
supposed to be involved with the Justice Department.” and “I am not supposed to be
involved with the F.B.I. I’m not supposed to be doing the kind of things that I would love
to be doing. And I’m very frustrated by it.”).
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protective reasons, Trump nominated Christopher Wray, formerly a
senior DOJ lawyer under George W. Bush, for the FBI directorship. In
the Senate Judiciary Committee report from the 1970s explaining why
a ten-year term with no removal restrictions for the FBI Director was
chosen, the Committee stated that firing a director mid-term would be
appropriate only due to “a substantial period of time [of] significant
disagreement and inability to cooperate with the law enforcement
policies [of] the Executive Branch.”38 It would be improper, the
Report warned, to fire a director “merely for the reason that a new
President desires his ‘own man’ in the position” or for partisan or
political reasons.39
Yet the Republican-controlled Senate, during Wray’s confirmation
hearings, did not approach the Wray confirmation hearing “with the
gravity it deserved” given the circumstances that led to the vacancy at
the top of the FBI.40 The majority of the Senate appeared “willing to
tolerate precisely the kind of abusive presidential interference with FBI
independence that it promised not to tolerate in the aftermath of
Watergate.”41
A bill to codify and strengthen the DOJ special counsel regulations42
under which Robert Mueller is currently investigating Russia’s election
interference and connections to the Trump campaign, was passed out
of the Senate Judiciary Committee,43 but has been languishing with
38

TEN-YEAR TERM FOR THE FBI DIRECTOR, S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 7 (1974).
Id.
40 Benjamin Wittes, Wray Does Well; the Senate Judiciary Committee Does Not,
LAWFARE (July 12, 2017, 4:58 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/wray-does-well-senatejudiciary-committee-does-not.
41 Andrew Kent, Congress Should Reconsider Giving the FBI Director Independence
from
Presidential
Control,
LAWFARE
(July
14,
2017,
9:00
AM),
www.lawfareblog.com/congress-should-reconsider-giving-fbi-director-independencepresidential-control [hereinafter Congress Should Reconsider]. It is true that before
Wray’s selection, some senators as well as outside commentators did declare that
partisan politicians — names floated by the White House included Rep. Trey Gowdy
(R-S.C.) and Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) — were unacceptable at the head of the FBI.
See Jack Goldsmith & Benjamin Wittes, Partisan Political Figures Cannot Run the FBI,
LAWFARE (May 15, 2017, 10:33 AM), www.lawfareblog.com/partisan-political-figurescannot-run-fbi (quoting Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)). And some Senators came to
the defense of their former colleague, Attorney General Sessions, when President
Trump insulted him publicly and repeatedly tried to pressure him to resign. See, e.g.,
Austin Wright, Seung Min Kim & Kyle Cheney, Republicans Rush to Sessions’ Defense,
POLITICO (July 25, 2017, 10:48 AM EDT), www.politico.com/story/2017/07/
25/lindsey-graham-jeff-sessions-trump-criticism-240935.
42 28 C.F.R. § 600 (2018).
43 See Nicholas Fandos, In Warning to Trump, Senators Advance Bill to Protect
Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/politics/
39
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little prospect of a floor vote in the Senate. And little else was done by
Congress during the first two years of Trump’s presidency to protect
or promote law enforcement independence and impartiality in the face
of sustained, unprecedented assaults on these norms by the President.
As this Article goes to press, control of the House of Representatives
has shifted to the Democratic party, which will likely lead to
invigorated oversight.
The muted and weak response to Trump by the 115th Congress
contrasts sharply with the Congresses of the 1970s Watergate era.
Congress then confronted widespread illegality and politicization of
law enforcement by the White House. It spent much of the decade
engaging in serious, thoughtful, and sustained oversight and
regulatory reform, producing enduring legal structures and norms of
law enforcement independence. The reforms have served the country
well for two generations. Political scientists spoke of a “resurgence” of
Congress.44 (Some executive officials complained of a “tethered
presidency.”45) The lessons and legacy of Congress’s post-Watergate
reforms have important implications for the present day.
B. Goals and Theoretical Frameworks
This Article has three inter-twined aims. First, the Article presents a
descriptive account of how Congress responded to abuses during the
1970s, with the goal of showing how Congress helped instantiate
norms of law enforcement independence and neutrality. Second,
drawing on congressional proposals from the 1970s, as well as tools
used by Congress to protect the independence of independent
regulatory commissions, the Article makes proposals for congressional
interventions that could respond to President Trump’s words and
actions. Third, the Article evaluates the constitutionality of these
suggested options.
The Article works within three important theoretical frameworks in
administrative law and political science scholarship. First, agency
independence from the White House is not a simple or single
phenomenon: there are a variety of structures and mechanisms
senate-mueller-protection-bill.html.
44 See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS
(1981) (discussing Congress’s resurgence of power in the era following Nixon’s
presidency).
45 See generally THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY: CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINTS ON
EXECUTIVE POWER (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981) (analyzing the historical conflict
between the legislative and executive branches and the resurgence of congressional
power).
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Congress uses to provide some agencies with some kinds of
independence, and not all agencies commonly understood as
“independent” have all of these features.46 Kirti Datla and Richard
Revesz have usefully suggested that agency independence be
conceived not as polar but as existing on a continuum.47 The legal or
structural indicia of independence of agencies include: removal
protection,48 a multimember leadership structure,49 specified terms in
office, sometimes longer than a President’s,50 partisan balance
requirements,51 the use of the word “independent” in the agency’s
authorizing statute,52 and others. While some of these features are
inapplicable to single person-headed law enforcement agencies like
DOJ and the FBI, the disaggregation of different independence
mechanisms is a useful lens through which to understand any agency
or department.
Second, Adrian Vermeule has rightly emphasized the powerful role
that “conventions” — “political norms within relevant legal and
political communities” whose violation is reasonably expected to
impose costs on the violator — play in deeming some agencies to be

46 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing different indicia of agency independence);
MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 4-5 (2015); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 26-41 (2010); Kirti
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772 (2013).
47 Datla & Revesz, supra note 46, at 825-27.
48 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018) (providing that commissioners heading the
Federal Trade Commission “may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office”); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2018) (“Any member of the
[National Labor Relations] Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and
hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”). These
provisions contrast with the lack of any statement regarding removal of cabinet
members such as the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Commerce, etc.
49 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2018) (providing that the Federal
Communications Commission is headed by a five-member board of commissioners,
one of whom is designed by the President as the chair).
50 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2018) (granting the commissioners of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) five-year terms).
51 E.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1), (5) (2018) (providing that, of the six voting
members who head the Federal Election Commission, “[n]o more than 3 members . . .
may be affiliated with the same political party,” and the chairman and vice chairman
“shall not be affiliated with the same political party”).
52 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2018) (“An independent regulatory commission is
hereby established, to be known as the Consumer Product Safety Commission.”).
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more independent than others, irrespective of underlying statutory
indicia of independence.53 And as Vermeule, Daphna Renan, and
others have observed, the independence of federal law enforcement
from the White House, such as it is, has been largely a matter of
conventions or norms rather than law.54 For my purposes, I will use
“norms” and “conventions” as interchangeable terms. Similar to
Vermeule’s definition of conventions, Renan, for example, defines
structural political norms as “unwritten or informal rules,” “informed
by but not clearly characterized as the legal,” that “govern political
behavior” because they are expected to be followed by important
societal groups (sociological legitimacy) and thought by those groups
to be normatively attractive or even compulsory.55 Recognizing the
role of conventions or norms means that responses to President
Trump’s threats to independence could take the form of legislation, or
could be less formal actions that signal displeasure and reproach by
Congress or the public and otherwise seek to buttress valuable
norms.56
Third, congressional oversight works, in that it often affects how the
executive branch carries out its responsibilities and functions,57 and
plays a critical role in defining and enforcing conventions or norms of
agency independence.58 Therefore, it is well worth thinking about how
Congress can use the many levers it has to promote better practices in
53 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163,
1165-66 (2013) [hereinafter Conventions]; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that the independence of SEC Commissioners is maintained in part by “a political
environment, reflecting tradition and function, that would impose a heavy political
cost upon any President who tried to remove a commissioner of the agency without
cause”).
54 See, e.g., Renan, supra note 25, at 2207-14 (arguing that a structural norm
insulates certain types of law enforcement investigative decision-making from
presidential control); Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1201-03 (exploring
how President George W. Bush and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales were
politically penalized for violating a convention that U.S. Attorneys not to be replaced
mid-term, even though statutory law and case law allowed at-will removal).
55 Renan, supra note 25, at 2196.
56 See, e.g., Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1182 (discussing sanctions
for breach of conventions).
57 See generally LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE 68-176 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing formal and informal techniques by which
Congress and individual committees and members influence the executive branch’s
administration of the laws); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) (reviewing how Congress oversees administration of the law
“both formally and informally”).
58 See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 46, at 4-5.
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federal law enforcement. And it is useful now, when norms of law
enforcement independence are being challenged by President Trump,
to understand the enormously important role Congress played in the
1970s in shaping those norms.
The remainder of this Article is in four parts. Part I sets the stage for
what follows. It briefly outlines the abusive practices of federal
enforcement agencies, and the politicization of those agencies by the
White House, that came to a head in the Watergate scandal. This Part
then highlights congressional oversight and reform efforts in the
1970s. It closes with a description of the powers and responsibilities of
the Attorney General and FBI Director today, after the lawmaking and
norm-creating of the 1970s. Part II draws on reform proposals from
the 1970s, among other sources, to suggest nine constitutionally
uncontroversial ways that Congress could act to buttress federal law
enforcement independence, neutrality, and professionalism. Part III
addresses two constitutionally controversial, more aggressive
possibilities: statutory restrictions on whom the President could
appoint to head the DOJ and FBI and on the President’s ability to
remove those officials. A conclusion offers a menu of specific
proposals that might be useful in the present environment.
I.

BACKGROUND: POWERS, ABUSES, AND CONGRESSIONAL REFORM

This Part first briefly outlines abusive conduct by the DOJ, FBI, and
Nixon White House that prompted widespread calls for reform in the
1970s. It then describes the highlights of the efforts by Congress to
reform federal law enforcement in the 1970s, helping to create the
norms of independence, nonpartisanship, and professionalism
described above. This Part closes with a summary of the powers and
responsibilities of the Attorney General and FBI Director today, to set
the stage for the discussions of reforms in Parts III and IV.
A. A Sketch of Abuses by DOJ, the FBI, and the Nixon White House
J. Edgar Hoover’s reign at the top of the FBI lasted from the creation
of the Bureau’s predecessor organization in 1924 until his death in
197259 — from President Coolidge to President Nixon. Under Hoover,
the Bureau’s many sins60 included programs to monitor, harass,
59 See, e.g., CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 32, 34
(1991).
60 The following paragraph recounts information found in many sources which
have exhaustively examined the abuses of Hoover-led FBI. See, e.g., SELECT COMM. TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK III:
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disrupt, and discredit — with real and fabricated salacious information
— supposedly subversive American political, religious, and social
groups and individuals, including the Black Panther Party, the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (led by Martin Luther
King, Jr.), anti-Vietnam War student groups, Earth Day environmental
activities, Muhammad Ali, John Lennon, Malcolm X, and many others.
The FBI surveilled, often illegally, and kept dossiers on thousands of
other Americans, including writers and entertainers suspected of
communist or radical views (e.g., Langston Hughes, Dorothy Parker,
Charlie Chaplin, Arthur Miller). The abuses of McCarthyism were
greatly furthered by Hoover and the FBI’s penchant for exaggerating
the communist threat. Several Presidents — Truman, Kennedy, and
Nixon — are known to have considered firing Hoover, but feared to
do so because of his political connections, popular support, and
willingness to credibly threaten blackmail.
As it grew greatly in size and power over the course of Hoover’s
directorship, the FBI operated largely free from legal constraint.61 The
organization lacked even a statutory charter.62 The Bureau was very
lightly overseen by both the Justice Department leadership and
Congress until the death of Hoover in the early 1970s.63
Hoover allowed the FBI to be used by President Lyndon Johnson as
a political intelligence service, for instance, by reporting on activities
by civil rights groups and liberal Democrats at the 1964 Democratic
Convention, and investigating and reporting on the backgrounds and

SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 4 (1976); DAVID GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 12 (2006); ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART COX, THE BOSS: J.
EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERICAN INQUISITION 3-15 (1988); ATHAN G.
THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE
HUSTON PLAN (1978) (describing various FBI domestic surveillance program); TIM
WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE FBI (2012) (providing examples of FBI
investigations under Hoover into various public figures and political groups).
61 FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
4 (1978) (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen.) (“Despite its long history, the
Bureau has received very little statutory guidance. There are, basically, only three
provisions defining its duties: [28 U.S.C. §§ 533-534 and 42 U.S.C. § 3744].”).
62 See id.
63 See, e.g., id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (“Congress and the
executive branch must share responsibility with the Bureau for the fact that the FBI
has never before been truly accountable to anyone for anything. The Bureau, for
decades, operated with independence from any day-to-day accountability within the
Justice Department or the executive branch. Congress only recently has exercised its
own responsibility to question the overall directions, the underlying policies, and the
basic program decisions of the Bureau.”).
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contacts of anti-Vietnam War groups and individuals.64 The pattern
continued under Nixon. The Nixon White House used the FBI to
investigate those they considered political opponents, which included
wiretapping sitting members of Congress and journalists.65 In
addition, Nixon had the FBI tap the telephones of members of the
National Security Council and journalists who he thought were
involved in leaks related to the war in Vietnam.66
For Attorney General, Nixon in 1969 had chosen John Mitchell, the
new President’s friend, former law partner, and manager of his
presidential campaign.67 Mitchell served as a close political adviser to
Nixon during the first term, and began working on the re-election
campaign well before he stepped down from the Attorney General’s
job in March 1972 to formally take charge of the Committee to ReElect the President (soon dubbed “CREEP” by Nixon critics).68 As
head of the re-election campaign, Mitchell approved plans for illegal
bugging of the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) headquarters
and other campaign dirty tricks, suggested by White House and
campaign aides.69 Mitchell was succeeded as Attorney General by
Richard Kleindienst, who came from a thoroughly political

64 See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL
HISTORY 126-27 (2004) [hereinafter CRITICAL HISTORY].
65 See id. at 128; see also STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST
CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 180, 233, 367 (1990).
66 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 256-57 (1973). At
that time, the legality of “national security”-related wiretaps was unclear. Congress in
1968 had regulated wiretapping for criminal investigations, imposing strict judicial
oversight, but a proviso in the law disclaimed an intent to outlaw national security
wiretapping pursuant to the President’s constitutional authorities. See Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211-14.
The so-called “national security” proviso was found at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). It was not
until near the end of Nixon’s first term — after a lot of non-statutory wiretapping
supposedly for national security purposes had already occurred — that the Supreme
Court made clear that wiretapping of “domestic” threats to national security must
proceed with judicial pre-approval, whether under the 1968 statute or a new one. See
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313-21 (1972).
The Court left open the question of the nature of the President’s constitutional
powers, and the Fourth Amendment restrictions on, purely executive wiretapping
aimed at “foreign” security threats. See id. at 309, 321-22. Wiretaps of domestic
individuals and organizations done for political purposes and installed by the
executive without judicial approval were quite obviously illegal.
67 NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 120-21 (1992) [hereinafter CONFLICTING LOYALTIES].
68 Id. at 121-23.
69 See id. at 122-25.
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background in Arizona.70 While in office, Kleindienst frequently
seemed to mix campaign activities, including fundraising, with
prosecutorial decisions.71
Somewhat ironically, given his decades of illegal and abusive
harassment and surveillance of suspected subversives, Hoover refused
to allow the FBI to participate in a radical, wide-ranging plan by Nixon
staffers to use the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) for
a broad campaign of illegal surveillance, breaking and entering, and
undercover infiltration aimed at student groups, journalists, and other
perceived opponents of the regime. Hoover’s refusal led Nixon to
create an in-house operation, dubbed the White House “plumbers.”72
It was some of these plumbers who later carried out the Watergate
burglary.
After Hoover died in office, in May 1972 President Nixon appointed
a DOJ official, L. Patrick Gray, to be acting director of the FBI. Nixon
believed that Gray would be pliable and loyal. The President had
known Gray since 1947, and Gray worked on Nixon’s 1960
presidential campaign.73 Soon after his acting appointment as head of
the FBI, Gray gave a campaign speech for the President in the
battleground state of Ohio.74
In the early morning of June 17, 1972, five men were caught
breaking into the DNC headquarters in the Watergate building in
Washington DC, carrying burglary tools and surveillance equipment.
Two were former FBI agents — Gordon Liddy and James McCord —
now working for Nixon’s re-election campaign. When an FBI
supervisor learned about the burglary, the Bureau opened an
investigation under the federal criminal statute banning unauthorized
wiretapping. A senior White House aide, John Ehrlichman, called the
FBI and stated: “I have a mandate from the President of the United

70 Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 70 (statement of Hon. Richard G.
Kleindienst, former Att’y Gen.) (noting that Kleindienst had chaired the Arizona
Republican State Committee, served in the Arizona legislature, run for governor, was
National Director of Field Operations for Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, and
had served as general counsel of the Republican National Committee).
71 See, e.g., RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: EXPOSING THE
TRUTH FROM WATERGATE TO 9/11, at 35 (2011) (recounting an instance in which
Kleindienst seemed willfully blind to the appearance of campaign funds being used as
a bribe).
72 SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at 260-61; see THEOHARIS, CRITICAL HISTORY, supra
note 64, at 128-30.
73 KUTLER, supra note 65, at 266.
74 Id. at 267.

1946

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1927

States . . . . The FBI is to terminate the investigation of the break-in.”75
After the supervisor who took the call refused, Ehrlichman threatened
that his career was “doomed.”76
Nixon then sent a top CIA official, a longtime friend, to falsely warn
the FBI that national security would be compromised if it did not drop
the investigation.77 Gray initially acceded to the request, but was
convinced by his top deputies that the FBI must continue to
investigate the matter, and do it as impartially as possible. “The FBI is
not under control, because Gray doesn’t exactly know how to control
them,” White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman lamented to Nixon.78
Attorney General Kleindienst ordered Gray to keep the White
House, via White House counsel John Dean, fully briefed on the FBI
investigation of the Watergate burglary and related events.79
Kleindienst also promised White House staff that he personally would
keep them informed.80 Henry Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division, tried to keep the Watergate investigation
narrow, and frequently reported on its progress to Dean.81 At the
request of Dean, Petersen tried to discourage a congressional
committee from investigating.82 Contrary to all protocol, Gray let
Dean sit in on FBI interviews of witnesses and suspects, and gave raw
FBI investigative materials to Dean.83 Dean bragged to Nixon during
the cover-up, “I was totally aware of what the Bureau was doing at all
times. I was totally aware of what the Grand Jury was doing.”84 Dean
used information from Gray and Petersen to coach witnesses to lie to
the grand jury.85 Even as the investigation had reached very close to
the Oval Office, Petersen and Kleindienst repeatedly briefed Nixon
about proceedings before the grand jury and likely indictments.86
75

WEINER, supra note 60, at 309.
Id. at 309-10.
77 Id. at 310-11; see also KUTLER, supra note 65, at 218-21.
78 WEINER, supra note 60, at 310.
79 See KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE: THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL THAT SHOOK AMERICA
48 (2016); Karlyn Barker & Walter Pincus, Watergate Revisited; 20 Years After the BreakIn, The Story Continues to Unfold, WASH. POST (June 14, 1992), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/watergate-revisited-20-years-after-the-break-in-the-storycontinues-to-unfold/2012/06/04/gJQAKaAqIV_story.html?utm_term=.31e20c60fd3b.
80 OLSON, supra note 79, at 48.
81 Id. at 49, 56.
82 Id. at 66.
83 Id. at 72.
84 Id. at 58.
85 Id. at 57.
86 Id. at 78-79.
76
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Mitchell actively participated in the Watergate cover-up, conspiring
with Dean and other White House staffers to destroy documents held
by CREEP and the White House.87 Mitchell also publicly lied about
the break-in.88
At his confirmation hearings, after being nominated by Nixon for
the FBI Directorship, Acting Director Gray admitted to the access into
the FBI investigation he had given to Dean.89 During the proceedings,
it also emerged that Gray had concealed and destroyed evidence of
wrongdoing from a White House safe belonging to one of Nixon’s
dirty tricks operatives.90
Gray resigned, and his nomination to be the confirmed FBI Director
was withdrawn. Mitchell eventually admitted that he had been
involved in planning the bugging and dirty tricks operations.91 He was
convicted by a jury of five counts related to Watergate perjury and
obstruction of justice.92 Kleindienst had to resign because of his close
professional and personal relationships with many people being
investigated, and press and congressional suspicion that he was
involved in the cover-up.93 It soon emerged that in 1971, while Deputy
Attorney General, Kleindienst had complied with a request from
Nixon to favorably settle an antitrust suit against ITT, a large U.S.based conglomerate; ITT was a big campaign donor to the Republican
National Convention. Kleindienst had denied having done this during
his confirmation hearings, and subsequently pled guilty to contempt
of Congress for having given false testimony.94 A third Nixon Attorney
General, Elliott Richardson, resigned in October 1973, only a few
months after succeeding Kleindienst, after refusing Nixon’s direction
to fire special counsel Archibald Cox who was investigating
Watergate.95
87

Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 50-51.
89 KUTLER, supra note 65, at 267-68.
90 OLSON, supra note 79, at 50, 82.
91 Id. at 81.
92 See Mitchell v. Ass’n of Bar of N.Y., 40 N.Y.2d 153, 155 (1976) (sustaining
disbarment of Mitchell and noting that he was convicted in federal court of
conspiracy, obstruction of justice, false statements to a grand jury, and perjury before
the Senate, all in connection with Watergate).
93 OLSON, supra note 79, at 84.
94 Id. at 120, 127; BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES, supra note 67, at 140; E.W.
Kenworthy, The Extraordinary I.T.T. Affair, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/16/archives/whats-good-for-a-corporate-giant-maynot-be-good-for-everybody-else.html.
95 Neil A. Lewis, Elliot Richardson Dies at 79; Stood Up to Nixon and Resigned in
88
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B. Congress’s Burst of Reformist Zeal
The size and scope of activities of the executive branch grew
enormously during the mid-twentieth century, during the presidencies
of Franklin D. Roosevelt through Lyndon Johnson. This growth in
resources at the president’s disposal, combined with the centralizing
pressures of the World War II and the Cold War, led to an enormous
“concentration of authority in the Presidency.”96 In 1973, historian
Arthur Schlesinger famously described an “imperial Presidency.”97
By the early 1970s, Congress had started pushing back.
Disillusionment with the war in Indochina and revulsion at the
criminality of the Nixon administration fueled a drive by Congress to
investigate and reform the executive branch. Congress used all of its
tools — prominently the investigative and oversight powers, its
authority to legislate, and the Senate’s gate-keeper role with
nominations for senior executive officials — to push a comprehensive
reform agenda.
Congressional committee hearings unearthed and publicized
scandalous executive branch behavior. The Senate Watergate
Committee (officially the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities98), chaired by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, a
conservative Democrat, aggressively investigated the Nixon’s
administration’s cover-ups, lies, and abuse of FBI and DOJ processes.99
The House Judiciary Committee adopted impeachment resolutions
against Nixon that prominently featured charges of political abuse of,
and interference with, DOJ and FBI investigative functions.100 Nixon
resigned soon thereafter.101 Congress also delved into FBI abuses of
Hoover’s tenure, most famously during the Church Committee
hearings in 1975, that also addressed misuse of the CIA and military to
spy on Americans.102 The Senate insisted during confirmation hearings
“Saturday Night Massacre,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/
01/01/us/elliot-richardson-dies-79-stood-up-nixon-resigned-saturday-night-massacre.html.
96 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at viii-ix (1973).
97 Id.
98 S. Res. 60, 93d Cong. (1973) (enacted).
99 For an account by the committee’s chief counsel, see SAMUEL DASH, CHIEF
COUNSEL: INSIDE THE ERVIN COMMITTEE — THE UNTOLD STORY OF WATERGATE 3-14
(1976).
100 See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
101 OLSON, supra note 79, at 164-66.
102 See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK III: SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, passim
(1976); LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY REVISITED: THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
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on nominees for top DOJ and FBI posts that they pledge to be
independent and nonpartisan.103 And numerous hearings were held on
ways to protect and bolster the independence, integrity, and apolitical
nature of federal law enforcement, as well as the civil liberties of
Americans who might be investigated.104
Some important statutory reforms directly responded to abuses of
the Hoover and Nixon eras — the secret wiretaps for thin or
pretextual “national security” reasons, the compilation and
distribution of derogatory dossiers on the American citizens, and the
inability of citizens to know what the government was saying about
them. To respond to this, Congress:
•

protected Americans against misuse of their personal
information by the government through the Privacy Act105 and
the Right to Financial Privacy Act;106

•

imposed judicial review and privacy protections on the
executive’s surveillance aimed for foreign intelligence
purposes, when conducted in the United States or targeted at
U.S. persons abroad;107 and

•

strengthened the Freedom of Information Act.108

An energized Congress ranged well beyond law enforcement reform,
into a broad array of areas where it perceived executive overreach or
abuse. In retrospect, we can see that the 1970s were watershed years
for the executive branch and the rule of law, as Congress, over a
number of years, enacted a large number of important statutes to
address past executive abuses and prevent future ones. Among other
things, Congress in the 1970s:
CONFRONTS AMERICA’S SPY AGENCIES, at xiv (2015).
103 See, e.g., Nomination of Clarence M. Kelley to be Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 25-26, 37-38
(1973) (colloquies between senators and Clarence M. Kelley).
104 See, e.g., FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong. 4 (1978); Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23.
105 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018)).
106 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697.
107 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783.
108 Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88
Stat. 1561 (amending Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 88-554, 80
Stat. 383). For a review of the changes made in 1974, see Benjamin R. Civiletti, PostWatergate Legislation in Retrospect, 34 SW. L.J. 1043, 1045-48 (1981).
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•

created an independent counsel mechanism to investigate
wrongdoing in the upper reaches of the executive branch;109

•

imposed financial disclosure obligations on members of
Congress and their staffs, executive branch officials, including
the President, and federal judges;110

•

installed largely independent inspectors general in executive
agencies to monitor for fraud and abuse and report to
Congress;111

•

created permanent select committees in both houses of
Congress to oversee the intelligence community;112

•

required a specific presidential finding and the briefing of
Congress for CIA covert actions;113

•

imposed strict limitations on the distribution and use of tax
returns to law enforcement and other government entities;114

•

reformed the civil
professionalism;115

•

strengthened campaign finance laws;116

service

to

protect

and

promote

109 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 601, 92 Stat.
1824, 1867-73. For affirmation of the constitutionality of the independent counsel
provisions, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988).
110 Ethics in Government Act, tit. I-III, 92 Stat. at 1824-61.
111 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, 1101
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-13 (2018)).
112 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong. (as passed by the House of Representatives,
July 14, 1977) (enacted as House Rule XLVIII) (creating the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence); S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (as passed by Senate, May 19,
1976) (creating the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence). For overviews of
congressional oversight of the intelligence community, see generally FRANK J. SMIST,
JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1994); L.
BRITT SNIDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: CIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS, 1946–
2004 (2008).
113 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-559, sec. 32, § 662, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804-05.
114 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XII, § 1202(a), 90 Stat.
1520, 1667-68 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2018)). A later-enacted
provision barred the White House from influencing IRS audits. See 26 U.S.C. § 7217
(2018).
115 See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1112-13.
116 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263,
1263-304. The 1974 Act amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
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•

repealed the Emergency Detention Act, which had been used
by the FBI to investigate allegedly subversive individuals and
organizations, in preparation for their non-criminal detention
during a national security crisis;117 and

•

attempted to regulate unilateral presidential war-making in the
War Powers Resolution.118

Amid this period of dramatic reform and restructuring of the
executive branch, Congress debated fundamental changes to the
structure of the DOJ and FBI. For instance, leading senators proposed
shielding both the Attorney General and FBI Director from
presidential control with a good-cause removal requirement.119 But
ultimately there was little structural reform of federal law enforcement
by Congress. Congress rejected any attempts to define binding
qualifications for the appointment of the FBI Director;120 rejected a
legislative charter for the Bureau that would have included statutory
protections for independence and civil liberties;121 rejected proposals
to move the FBI out from under the supervision and control of the
Attorney General; declined to take selection of U.S. Attorneys away
from the President; and rejected bills proposing that the FBI Director
and Attorney General could be fired only for good cause. The one
structural reform adopted was a 1976 law giving the FBI Director a
non-renewable ten-year term in office, but with no restriction on
removal.122
Some legislative reforms were headed off by self-regulatory
initiatives of the executive branch. For instance, Attorney General
No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, which had been greatly abused during the 1972 elections. J.
Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1003
(1976) (“Congress passed these provisions in response to political abuses which
culminated in the 1972 presidential campaign and its aftermath . . . .”).
117 See Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347, 347-48
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018)).
118 See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, 555-60 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-49 (2018)). On the background of this legislation, see generally
SUNDQUIST, supra note 44, at 238-60.
119 See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation Reorganization and Reform Act, S.
1502, 93d Cong. § 6, CONG. REC. 11353 (1973) (introduced by Sen. Henry M.
Jackson).
120 See supra note 10; infra notes 275–93 and accompanying text.
121 Several comprehensive charters for the FBI were proposed in the 1970s, but
none adopted. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation Charter Act, S. 2928, 96th
Cong., 126 CONG. REC. 18559 (1980); Federal Bureau of Investigation Charter Act of
1979, S. 1612, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 21507 (1979).
122 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Edward Levi in 1976 adopted guidelines for FBI domestic intelligence
agencies that sought to prevent any repeat of the abuses of the Hoover
era.123 Attorney General Griffin Bell in 1978 adopted rules that
dramatically restricted White House contacts with the DOJ and FBI.124
Presidents Carter and Ford, seeking to clean off the stains of the
Nixon years, appointed senior law enforcement officials who were
committed to independence, integrity, and nonpartisanship.
But coming out of the 1970s, nothing in binding law sought to
mandate that the heads of the DOJ or FBI possess and abide by these
ideals. Norms, not law, were left to do this work.125
C. Powers of the Attorney General and FBI Director Today
To set the stage for the legal analysis that follows, it is important to
understand the allocation and extent of legal powers over law
enforcement as they exist today, after the reforms of previous decades.
The Attorney General, appointed by the President with the Senate’s
advice and consent,126 heads the DOJ and is authorized to exercise all
authorities delegated to the DOJ or any of its components by
Congress, and to subdelegate to his or her subordinates.127 DOJ
components supervised by the Attorney General include the FBI; Drug
Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives; Bureau of Prisons; Office of Justice Programs; and the
U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshals Service.128 Except as authorized by
statute, all litigation for the United States government, “and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,
under the direction of the Attorney General.”129 Among other things,
the Attorney General oversees the enforcement in court of all federal
criminal laws and, unless specifically provided otherwise by statute,

123 See John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 785, 793-94 (1984).
124 See Bell Address, supra note 23 at 3-10.
125 See Kent, Congress Should Reconsider, supra note 41.
126 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2018) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney
General is the head of the Department of Justice.”).
127 Id. §§ 503, 509, 510 (2018).
128 Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and
Associate, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/organizationmission-and-functions-manual-attorney-general [hereinafter Organization, Mission &
Functions]; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.5 (2018) (outlining the duties of the Attorney
General).
129 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2018).
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civil statutes as well. By executive order, the Attorney General
provides oversight of the domestic intelligence gathering of federal
agencies.130 Other functions of the Attorney General include
“[f]urnish[ing] advice and opinions, formal and informal, on legal
matters to the President and the Cabinet and to the heads of the
executive departments and agencies of the government,” “[m]ak[ing]
recommendations to the President concerning appointments to federal
judicial positions and to positions within the Department, including
U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshals,” and “[r]epresent[ing] or
supervis[ing] the representation of the United States Government in
the Supreme Court of the United States and all other courts, foreign
and domestic, in which the United States is a party or has an interest
as may be deemed appropriate.”131
Primary responsibility for “prosecut[ing] . . . all offenses against the
United States” is given by statute to U.S. Attorneys, within their
respective districts.132 These U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a four-year
term,133 housed within the DOJ, hierarchically under the Attorney
General,134 and are expressly subject to removal by the President.135
Since 1968, the FBI Director has been appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.136 The FBI, headed by the
director, is the primary federal law enforcement agency and the lead
domestic intelligence agency. Exercising delegated authority from the
Attorney General, the FBI Director “shall . . . [i]nvestigate violations of
the laws . . . of the United States and collect evidence in cases in which
the United States” is involved or interested, unless such responsibility
to exclusively assigned to another agency.137 The FBI is the lead
agency to investigate a wide variety of federal crimes, including those
in highly salient and sensitive areas such as terrorism, espionage and
foreign counterintelligence, foreign sabotage, arms and technology
smuggling, domestic political and political campaign corruption,
mishandling or leaking of protected government information, and
intentional interference with voting rights and civil rights.
130 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), Part 2 (as
amended). For the amendment history of the executive order, see supra note 18.
131 See Organization, Mission & Functions, supra note 128.
132 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2018).
133 Id. § 541(a)-(b).
134 28 C.F.R. § 0.5(a) (2018).
135 28 U.S.C. § 541(c).
136 See supra note 10.
137 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(a).
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The FBI is also the lead domestic intelligence agency. As such it
exercises powers delegated by both the President and Congress to
investigate discrete intelligence matters and engages in “broader
analytic and planning functions.”138 To protect the liberties of
Americans, the CIA — an entity not schooled in due process — is
barred from exercising any “police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers or internal security functions.”139 No intelligence community
entity except the FBI is allowed to engage within the United States in
“foreign intelligence collection . . . for the purpose of acquiring
information concerning the domestic activities of United States
persons.”140 The FBI’s other major functions are to provide
investigative assistance to other federal law enforcement agencies, as
well as state, local, tribal, and foreign entities; and to retain, analyze,
and share law enforcement relevant information,141 such as biomarkers
like fingerprints.
DOJ regulations require the FBI Director to “report to the Attorney
General on all . . . activities” of the FBI.142 In its intelligence
community capacity, the FBI is also placed under the “supervision” of
the Attorney General and subject to the coordinating, information
collecting, and tasking authorities of the Director of National
Intelligence.143
FBI special agents have delegated authority, subject to the direction
and control of the director, to investigate violations of criminal and
civil laws of the United States; gather evidence for court cases; make
arrests; serve and execute arrest warrants; serve judicial subpoenas;
execute warrants to seize property; serve administrative subpoenas in
certain circumstances (investigations of drug programs, health care
fraud, and child exploitation); serve National Security Letters (similar
to administrative subpoenas) to obtain banking, credit, consumer and
related records; and carry firearms.144 Guidelines issued by the
Attorney General govern the opening of FBI investigations and then
138 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE
§ 2.3 (2013) [hereinafter DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE].
139 50 U.S.C. § 3036(d)(1).
140 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), § 2.3(b).
141 See Indian County Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
investigate/violent-crime/indian-country-crime (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Law
Enforcement, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/resources/lawenforcement (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
142 28 C.F.R. § 0.85a.
143 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, §§ 1.3, 1.5, 1.7(g), § 1.14.
144 See DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 138, §§ 2.4.5,
18.6.4.3.1, 18.6.6.
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investigative steps that may be used.145 As greater investigative powers
are granted, higher level supervisory approval and more stringent
factual and legal predicates are required. Attorney General guidelines
and an executive order require that all investigations and intelligence
gathering by the FBI must occur by the “least intrusive” means or
method possible, based on the circumstances.146
The involvement of DOJ prosecutors and often, the judiciary, is
legally required for the most intrusive measures. FBI agents can seek
to obtain information through federal grand jury subpoenas only by
requesting a U.S. Attorney’s Office to do so.147 By statute and executive
branch rules, wiretaps can be sought by the FBI only with concurrence
of DOJ attorneys, and applications must be granted by a judicial
officer. No criminal prosecution may be initiated by the FBI acting
alone; only DOJ attorneys are authorized to take this step.148
II.

A MENU OF OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS, PART ONE: THE LESS
CONSTITUTIONALLY CONTROVERSIAL

This Part presents a number of options for a Congress which desires to
bolster the fraying norms of law enforcement independence and
impartiality. More constitutionally doubtful options are saved for Part IV.
A. The Advice and Consent Function
All principal officers of the United States — in the executive branch,
think heads of departments and agencies — must be nominated and
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate.149 This is also the default mode of appointment for so-called
inferior officers — persons exercising significant power pursuant to
the laws of the United States but under the supervision of a principal
officer.150 The most important offices in federal law enforcement all
145

See id. § 4.4.1.
See id.
147 Id. §§ 18.5.9.1, 18.5.9.3, 18.6.5.3.2.
148 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-2.030 (2018) (“The United
States Attorney is authorized to initiate prosecution by filing a complaint, requesting
an indictment from the grand jury, and when permitted by law, by filing an
information in any case which, in his or her judgment, warrants such action . . . .”).
149 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
150 Id. For the definition of an “officer of the United States,” see Lucia v. SEC, 138
S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (stating that officers have “continuing and permanent” as
opposed to “occasional and temporary” duties (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879))); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (“The
exercise of ‘significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States’ marks . . .
146
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require Senate advice and consent, giving the Senate a very important
role to play in preserving law enforcement independence. These
offices — for example, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General,
U.S. Attorney, FBI Director — wield enormous powers, for good or ill,
making essential Senatorial attention to the character, integrity, and
experience of nominees.
Since Hoover’s death, every confirmation hearing for a permanent
FBI Director has featured Senators and the nominee insisting that the
FBI remain an independent, professional, nonpartisan agency.151
Frequently, nominees have stated that they sought and received
assurances from the President and Attorney General, before agreeing
to take the job, that they would have substantial independence.152 In
advance of hearings, senators might tell nominees that they will seek a
public record of such assurances, thereby incentivizing nominees to
the line between officer and nonofficer.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126
(1976))). On the distinction between inferior and principal officers, see id. at 663
(“[I]n the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to
important Government assignments, we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
151 See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of James B. Comey, Jr., to be
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2, 7, 9, 118 (2013) (statements of Sen. Leahy, Sen. Blumenthal
and nominee Comey); Mueller Hearing, supra note 25, at 3, 61, 87, 132 (statements of
Sen. Leahy, Sen. Biden and nominee Mueller); Nomination of Louis J. Freeh to be
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 24-25, 32 (1995) [hereinafter Freeh Hearing] (statements of Sen.
Hatch, Sen. Grassley and nominee Louis J. Freeh); Hon. William Sessions Hearing,
supra note 25, at 10, 27-28 (statements of Sen. Leahy and nominee Jeff Sessions);
Nomination of William H. Webster, of Missouri, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 19, 71-72, 75
(1978) [hereinafter Webster Hearing] (statements of Sen. Wallop, nominee William H.
Webster); Nomination of Clarence M. Kelley to be Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 14, 25-26, 36-37
(1973) (statements of Sen. Hruska, Sen. Hart, Sen. Kennedy and nominee Clarence M.
Kelley); Full Committee Hearing on the Nomination of Christopher Wray to be Director of
the FBI, FED. NEWS SERV. (July 12, 2017).
152 See Freeh Hearing, supra note 151, at 32 (nominee Freeh stating that he had “a
frank discussion with both the President and the Attorney General” about “use [of]
the FBI for political purposes or political interference” and “I am confident that they
are committed to an independent FBI Director”); Hon. William Sessions Hearing, supra
note 25, at 27-28 (nominee Sessions stating that he confirmed with the Attorney
General a commitment to an independent FBI free from political influence and that he
views direct White House contact with the FBI as “improper”); Webster Hearing, supra
note 151, at 19, 72 (nominee Webster stating “assurances” from the President and
Attorney General of “independence in the conduct of criminal investigations” and
“hands off politically”).
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have conversations about independence with the President and
Attorney General. Even without such conversations, a public pledge,
under oath, of a commitment to independence is useful. It precommits the nominee, and provides a focal point for later oversight
hearings if the commitment does not appear to have been honored.
To ensure that nominees have bipartisan support, the Senate might
consider bringing back the filibuster for confirmation of officials like
the Attorney General, FBI Director, or U.S. Attorneys. Academics have
debated the constitutionality of filibuster,153 but there is essentially no
way for a legal challenge to be made justiciable, meaning that the
Senate will have a free hand to act by internal rule.
B. Congressional Hearings
Congress has very wide powers to conduct oversight of the
executive branch,154 and essentially unlimited power to holding
hearings to publicly air the opinions of members of Congress or third
parties. “Agency officials can be noticeably influenced by the
knowledge and expectation that they will be called before a
congressional committee regularly to account for the activities of their
agencies.”155 There is much that Congress, via one or more of its
committees, could do to bolster law enforcement independence
though hearings that would be entirely uncontroversial from a
constitutional perspective. Two obvious possibilities are: (1) hearings
on the importance of law enforcement independence and nonpartisanship, featuring respected former government officials,
academics, and other authorities, and (2) oversight hearings at which
officials like the Attorney General and the FBI Director are questioned
closely about any instances of White House interference, and asked to
153 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1003 (2011); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV.
181 (1997); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 445 (2004); Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation:
The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 261, 31720 (2013).
154 See generally Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959)
(discussing the use and extent of Congress’s ability to conduct oversight of the other
branches of the federal government); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-74
(1927) (discussing the limits of Congress’s investigative powers); Andrew McCanse
Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881, 89398 (2014) (outlining the extent to which the Constitution permits congressional
oversight of the Executive Branch).
155 ALISSA M. DOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
MANUAL 72 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf [hereinafter CRS MANUAL].
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publicly articulate the importance of norms of independence.
Congress’s aggressive use of oversight hearings in the 1970s was a
useful tool for inculcating norms of law enforcement independence.156
C. Censure
Congress has the power to pass resolutions of censure against
executive officials, including the President. These simple or
concurrent resolutions do not have binding legal effect,157 but do
“express a particular moral judgment and may have both symbolic as
well as political implications.”158 At least four times, a chamber of the
Congress has adopted a censure resolution directed at a President.159
And many more have been introduced but not acted on.
These formally non-binding resolutions — which are not subject to
disapproval by the President — are often not worth the paper they are
written on. But in some contexts, a statement of policy or principle —
especially if enacted by both houses, and/or on a bipartisan basis —
can have important political and communicative effects. As Jacob
Gersen and Eric Posner have argued, these kinds of “soft statutes” can
have two primary effects. “First, Congress . . . uses soft law to convey
information about future intentions to enact hard law, allowing people
to adjust their behavior in advance of binding statutes and in some
cases avoiding constitutional requirements that apply to hard law.”160
And “[s]econd, Congress uses soft law to convey information about its
beliefs about the state of the world — both factual and normative.”161

156 See, e.g., Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 23 (collecting press
coverage of congressional hearings on the need for law enforcement independence).
157 See JANE A. HUDIBURG & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RESOLUTIONS TO CENSURE THE PRESIDENT: PROCEDURE AND HISTORY 1 (2018),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45087.pdf. Simple resolutions are passed by a majority of
one house and concurrent resolutions by a majority of both houses, and may declare
the policy or “sense” of Congress. See JACK MASKELL & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE AND “NO CONFIDENCE” VOTES REGARDING
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 2 (2016), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45087.pdf.
158 MASKELL & BETH, supra note 157, at Summary.
159 Jane A. Hudiburg, Resolutions Censuring the President: History and Context, 1stRESEARCH
SERVICE
(Sept.
14,
2017),
114th
Congresses,
CONG.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
IN10775.pdf.
160 Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 586 (2008).
161 Id. at 587.
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Congress or either house of it could use this power to publicize their
disagreement with actions by Presidents which undermine norms of
law enforcement independence and neutrality.
D. Impeachment
By a majority vote, the House of Representatives may impeach the
President or other executive or judicial officers of the United States; If
two-thirds of the Senate convicts, the official is removed from office.162
In July 1974, the Judiciary Committee of the House, by a bipartisan
vote, approved three articles of impeachment against President Nixon.
Because of the seeming inevitability of impeachment by the House and
removal by the Senate, Nixon resigned a few weeks later.
Two of the articles enunciated important principles about the
independence of federal law enforcement from the White House.
Article I charged Nixon with violation of his oath and obstruction of
justice by, among other things, lying and causing others to lie to
federal criminal investigators, withholding material evidence, and
“interfering or endeavouring to interfere with the conduct of
investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, [and] the office of Watergate Special
Prosecution Force . . . .”163 The Judiciary Committee thus announced,
after lengthy debate and extensive hearings, that a President violates a
core responsibility of the office if he or she seeks to mislead, obstruct,
or defeat a criminal investigation for self-interested or self-protective
reasons.164 Article II charged Nixon with violating his oath, failure to
faithfully execute the laws, and impairing “the due and proper
administration of justice” by, among other wrongful acts, “knowingly
misus[ing] the executive power by interfering with agencies of the
executive branch, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Criminal Division, and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution
Force, of the Department of Justice,” and by directing federal law
enforcement agencies to spy on and gather information about
American citizens for purposes other than bona fide national security
or criminal investigative reasons.165 In this article, the Judiciary
Committee announced the important principle that federal executive
agencies must have good faith and public interest reasons to gather
162

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 4.
IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP.
NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974).
164 See id. at 1-2.
165 Id. at 3-4.
163
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information on Americans, and cannot be used as political or personal
spies for the President.
Without going into too much detail, I think it is fair to say that
President Trump’s time in office will prove fertile ground if the House
of Representatives investigates whether impeachment may be
warranted. Special focus on his interference with and attempts to
misuse federal law enforcement institutions would be appropriate.
E. Government Accountability Office Investigations
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) (formerly the
General Accounting Office) is a congressional agency tasked with
auditing, investigating, and reporting on the executive branch.166 GAO
can be tasked to perform investigations or other oversight activities by
congressional committees or subcommittees or public laws.167
In addition to broad authorization to audit the spending of money,
GAO has statutory authority to “evaluate the results of a program or
activity the Government carries out under existing law. . . .”168 The
executive branch has taken the position that the reference to “under
existing law” only covers executive activities to carry out statutory
programs, not executive activities authorized solely by the President’s
constitutional powers.169 Since criminal law enforcement functions of
the DOJ and FBI involve at their core the carrying out of a statutory
program — embodied in the statutes criminalizing certain conduct
and tasking specific executive agencies with investigating and
prosecuting violations — GAO would seem to have sufficient statutory
authority to carry out broad-ranging investigations of the
166 GAO’s Mission, Responsibilities, Strategies, and Means: Mission Statement, U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/dsp/3mission.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2019) (“GAO works to continuously improve the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of the federal government by conducting financial audits, program
reviews and evaluations, policy analyses, legal opinions, investigations, and other
services. GAO’s activities are designed to ensure the executive branch’s accountability
to the Congress under the Constitution and the federal government’s accountability to
the American people.”); see 31 U.S.C. § 702(a) (2018) (“The Government
Accountability Office is an instrumentality of the United States Government
independent of the executive departments.”).
167 See 31 U.S.C. § 717(d)(1); About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); The Report Process,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/reportstestimonies/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
168 31 U.S.C. § 717(b).
169 Investigative Auth. of the Gen. Accounting Office, 12 Op. O.L.C. 171, 172
(1988).
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politicization of law enforcement. So a Congress or congressional
committee or subcommittee interested in investigating — and hence
disincentivizing — partisan law enforcement and improper White
House interference could set GAO loose to investigate. One possibility:
GAO could be asked to determine under what circumstances and for
what reasons the DOJ and the FBI decided to re-open closed
investigations of Hillary Clinton, after President Trump publicly called
for that action.
F.

Mission Statements or Job Descriptions Emphasizing Apolitical,
Impartial Norms

Congress sometimes formally articulates the mission of agencies or
offices. The Department of Homeland Security, to take one example,
has a statutory mission that includes affirmative areas of responsibility
— including to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States” —
as well as guidance on how responsibilities should be carried out — to
“ensure that the civil rights and civil liberties of persons are not
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the
homeland.”170 Congress can also use statutory mission statements to
emphasize the independence of an independent agency.171 Either or
both of DOJ and the FBI could be given statutory mission statements
of this kind, emphasizing the need for impartial, apolitical law
enforcement.
Similarly, when Congress creates an office, it often describes the
responsibilities and authorities of that office. Congress can use this as
an opportunity to emphasize important norms. For example, Congress
has specified that the Director of National Intelligence must provide to
the President, heads of executive departments, and Congress “national
intelligence” that is “timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence
community.”172 Using this statute as a drafting example, Congress
could specify the law enforcement and national security functions of
the Attorney General, FBI Director, or both, and state that they should
be carried out in an objective, independent manner that is free from
political considerations.
170

6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(E).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a) (“The mission of the [Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety] Board shall be to provide independent analysis, advice, and recommendations
to the Secretary of Energy to inform the Secretary . . . in providing adequate protection
of public health and safety at such defense nuclear facilities.”).
172 50 U.S.C. § 3024(a)(1)-(2).
171
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Would such a statutory mission statement or norm-based job
description be simply useless “cheap talk”173 by Congress? Without
overselling the effects of such a move, congressional statements of this
kind could plausibly have a number of benefits. It would communicate
expectations to leadership and staff at the FBI about independence and
impartiality, helping further inculcate those values in the culture, and
giving a concrete statutory reference to help them push back against
improper requests or contacts by, say, the White House. It could be a
useful focal point for overseeing and measuring the performance of the
FBI by Congress, the press, and the public. It would also put the
White House on notice about congressional expectations, in the same
way a “sense of Congress” resolution discussed above would.
G. Codifying a Policy on White House-DOJ Contacts
President Carter and his first Attorney General, Griffin Bell, were
both committed to separating the DOJ’s investigative and prosecutorial
functions from any White House interference. In a major policy
speech in 1978, Bell conceded that “the partisan activities of some
Attorneys General in this century, combined with the unfortunate
legacy of Watergate, have given rise to an understandable public
concern that some decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or
pressure, or politics.”174 To ensure that, in reality and appearance, DOJ
lawyers could exercise their independent professional judgments free
from pressure or politics, Bell announced that henceforth:
[A]ll communications about particular [civil or criminal]
cases, from Members of Congress or their staffs, or members of
the White House staff, should be referred to my office, or the
offices of the Deputy or the Associate Attorney General. It will
be our job to screen these communications to insure that any
improper attempts to influence a decision do not reach
division heads,175
much less their subordinates.
When Benjamin Civiletti replaced Bell as Attorney General later in
Carter’s term, he distilled the Bell policies into a more succinct

173 This is a term from game theory, meaning communication that imposes no
direct cost on the sender or receiver. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap
Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 104 (1996).
174 Bell Address, supra note 23, at 3.
175 Id. at 7.
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memorandum.176 White Houses have had their own policies too,
which strictly limit the number of people authorized to contact the
DOJ about pending or impending matters. These policies were
followed during the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton
presidencies.
White House-DOJ coordination on policy matters is basically always
appropriate, and not covered by these policies. In addition, the
policies allowed contacts, where necessary to carrying out the
President’s constitutional responsibilities and occurring through
appropriate channels.177 As a recent study explained,
For example, the White House Counsel might discuss a
pending Supreme Court case with the Solicitor General,
request a formal legal opinion from the Office of Legal
Counsel, or discuss clemency matters with the Pardon
Attorney. Similarly, on national security matters, it is expected
that the FBI will be in regular contact with the National
Security Advisor and his staff on matters of national security,
which
could
include
information
about
ongoing
investigations.178
During the George W. Bush administration, both the DOJ and the
White House significantly relaxed their policies. The number of White
House officials allowed to contact the DOJ on non-national security
matters increased from four to 417, and eventually to 895.179 A scandal
about politicization of law enforcement was the predictable result.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales ended up resigning after the fallout from the highly unusual mid-term removal of nine U.S. Attorneys,
in contexts in which politics seemed plausibly to be involved.180 Bush’s
final attorney general, Michael Mukasey, reinstated stricter controls,181
176 See Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Offices,
Bds., Bureaus and Divs. 1 (Oct. 18, 1979), http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/
civiletti/1979/10-18-1979.pdf.
177 See White House Communications with the DOJ and FBI, PROTECT DEMOCRACY
(Mar. 8, 2017), http://protectdemocracy.org/agencycontacts/.
178 Id.
179 Jane Chong, White House Interference with Justice Department Investigations?
That 2009 Holder Memo, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2017, 4:12 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.
com/white-house-interference-justice-department-investigations-2009-holder-memo.
180 See id.; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S.
ATTORNEYS IN 2006 1 (2008), http://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf [hereinafter
IG & OPR REPORT].
181 See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t
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which were reiterated during President Obama’s tenure.182 Vermeule
cites this as an example of conventional agency independence — U.S.
Attorneys, in theory, are at-will employees of the President, but a
strong norm had developed which protected them from mid-term
firing, especially for political reasons.183
The Trump administration started to flagrantly violate these policies
within days of taking office.184 Given the bipartisan agreement that
these norms about White House-DOJ contacts and interference are
necessary and appropriate,185 Congress could usefully intervene here
to strengthen them. Rather than dictating the precise content of a
policy, it might be wiser for Congress to legislate a requirement that
the Attorney General promulgate regulations via a notice-andcomment process. This would allow public involvement in
deliberations about the appropriate rules, and would give greater
flexibility to change them as appropriate in the future. Congress could,
however, require that any such regulations take as their overriding
goal the protection of DOJ (including FBI) neutrality, nonpartisanship, and independence from White House and congressional
interference on pending or impending civil or criminal matters —
with appropriate exceptions for instances of the type noted above
(e.g., discussions with the Solicitor General about matters of legal
policy in a case pending in the Supreme Court). Especially if the
statutory delegation included a statement that the regulations allow
sufficient flexibility for the President to carry out his or her
constitutional responsibilities, it is hard to see how this type of
congressional intervention could be criticized on constitutional
grounds. Congress might also specify that violations of the regulations
must be reported to relevant committees of Congress and the
Department of Justice Inspector General. A useful bill embodying this
requirement was introduced in the Senate in 2007.186

Components & All U.S. Attorneys 1-2 (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.justsecurity.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/06/AG-2007-Memo-Communications-with-White-House.pdf.
182 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and
All U.S. Attorneys 1, 4 (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/communications_with_the_white_house_and_congress_2009.pdf.
183 Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1201-03.
184 See, e.g., White House Communications with the DOJ and FBI, supra note 177.
185 In addition to adopting policies by White Houses and Attorneys General of both
parties, consider the recent recommendations of a bipartisan group convened by the
Brennan Center. See NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 1, 17-20.
186 See S. REP. NO. 110-203, at 1, 7 (2007) (describing how the bill would impose
on the Department of Justice and White House a semi-annual reporting requirement).
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H. Added Duties for DOJ Inspector General
One of the important congressional reforms of the 1970s was to
install inspectors general in many executive agencies, tasked with
investigating and reporting to both Congress and agency heads on
fraud, waste, abuse, and employee misconduct.187 Additional
inspectors general were added over time.188 These are powerful offices.
Except with respect to certain very sensitive issues — for example,
ongoing criminal investigations within DOJ — agency heads may not
prevent inspectors general from carrying out any investigative or
auditing function which the inspector has deemed appropriate.189
Reporting to Congress is mandatory,190 making inspectors general a
uniquely-positioned oversight tool for the legislature.191
The DOJ Inspector General is already empowered to investigate
politicization of law enforcement, and related issues about
independence and impartiality.192 For example, when senior political
leadership at DOJ ordered the firing of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 —
a highly unusual move, because U.S. Attorneys by tradition are
replaced at the beginning of a President’s term and then remain in
office for the duration — the Inspector General, along with the DOJ
Office of Personnel Management, conducted a comprehensive
investigation. The investigation focused on “whether [the U.S.
Attorneys] were removed for partisan political purposes, or to
influence an investigation or prosecution, or to retaliate for their
actions in any specific investigation or prosecution.”193
187 See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-13 (2018)). The core duties of inspectors general are
found in 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a). Congress acted because of concern about corruption
and waste in federal government operations, and the belief that existing audit and
investigative functions were inadequately structured because they reported to the
officials whom they were supposed to investigate. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 4-6
(1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 5 (1977).
188 See, e.g., Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504,
§ 102(c), 102 Stat. 2515, 2515-16 (creating an office of inspector general for the
Department of Justice).
189 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (2018) (general rule); 5 U.S.C. app. § 8E(a) (special rules
for certain sensitive DOJ functions).
190 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(a).
191 On the constitutionality of Congress requiring that executive branch officials
provide information to Congress, see Vicki Divoll, The “Full Access Doctrine”:
Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National Security Information from the Executive,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 513-18 (2011).
192 For regulations governing the DOJ Inspector General, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.290.29j (2018).
193 IG & OPR REPORT, supra note 180, at 1.
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Congress could consider confirming that law enforcement
independence is and should remain an important part of the remit of
the DOJ Inspector General through a statutory amendment. The
inspector general of DOJ already has qualified access to investigative
and prosecutorial documents and testimony,194 and any new
legislation touching this area should be sensitive to legitimate
executive concerns about privilege and confidentiality.
I.

Ensure that a Senate-Confirmed Officer Always Heads the DOJ

After President Trump forced the resignation of Attorney General
Jeff Sessions, Trump invoked the Federal Vacancies Reform Act
(“FVRA”) to install Matthew Whitaker, who had been serving as chief
of staff to Sessions, as the Acting Attorney General.195 Whitaker’s post
had not required Senate confirmation. Based on Whitaker’s public
statements prior to taking the job and other sources, it was widely
assumed that President Trump chose Whitaker to rein in the special
counsel probe of Trump-Russia collusion headed by Robert Mueller.196
Whitaker’s thin resume exacerbates the concerns about the reasons for
the appointment. As Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist,
the requirement of the Senate’s concurrence was designed to prevent
the President from appointing to significant offices a person “in some
way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments
of his pleasure.”197 Congress should consider amending the FVRA to
clarify that it does not displace a DOJ-specific statute currently on the
books, which establishes a line of succession for an absent Attorney
General involving only Senate-confirmed DOJ officials.198
194 See Memorandum from Karl Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. 3 (July 20, 2015), 2015
WL 8042627.
195 Baker et al., Jeff Sessions is Forced Out, supra note 35; John E. Bies, Matthew
Whitaker’s Appointment as Acting Attorney General: Three Lingering Questions, LAWFARE
(Nov, 8, 2018, 10:04 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/matthew-whitakersappointment-acting-attorney-general-three-lingering-questions.
196 See e.g., Baker et al., Jeff Sessions is Forced Out, supra note 35; John Kruzel, Is
Donald Trump’s Pick of Matthew Whitaker for Acting Attorney General Legal?,
POLITIFACT (Nov. 15, 2018 12:15 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2018/nov/15/donald-trumps-pick-matthew-whitaker-acting-attorne/.
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
198 See 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2018) (“Vacancies. (a) In case of a vacancy in the office of
Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may
exercise all the duties of that office . . . . (b) When [. . . ] neither the Attorney General
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III. PART TWO OF THE MENU: MORE CONSTITUTIONALLY AGGRESSIVE
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS
This Part analyzes the constitutionality of two kinds of measures for
Congress that would likely have more “bite” than the ones in Part II:
statutory qualifications for senior DOJ officials and statutory
requirement that the FBI Director may only be removed by the
President for good cause. I have omitted a treatment of potential
legislation to supplement DOJ special counsel regulations and further
protect a special counsel from unjustified removal because bills have
already been introduced and the constitutional issues have already
been ably covered by other commentators.199
A. Appointment: Statutory Qualifications or Eligibility Rules for Senior
DOJ Roles
One way that Congress could attempt to protect the independence
and impartiality of the DOJ and FBI is by setting qualifications or
eligibility rules for the persons whom the President may select for
agency leadership. Currently, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney
General, Associate Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant
Attorneys General, U.S. Attorneys, and FBI Director are selected by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. None of the
offices currently have any statutory qualifications or eligibility rules
for nominees.
Congress has very broad authority to prescribe the qualifications or
rules of eligibility for executive office-holders, and has exercised this
power frequently since the beginning of government under the
Constitution.200 The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the Attorney
nor the Deputy Attorney General is available to exercise the duties of the office of
Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General shall act as Attorney General. The
Attorney General may designate the Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorneys
General, in further order of succession, to act as Attorney General.”). For the statutes
requiring that these named officials be confirmed by the Senate, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 50406 (2018).
199 See, e.g., Letter from Professors Eric Posner & Stephen Vladeck, to Senators
Charles Grassley & Dianne Feinstein (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Posner-Vladeck-Letter-on-S2644.pdf; Richard H. Pildes,
Could Congress Simply Codify the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations?, LAWFARE (Aug. 3,
2017, 8:30 AM), http://lawfareblog.com/could-congress-simply-codify-doj-specialcounsel-regulations; Steve Vladeck, It’s Time for Congress to Pass the Mueller Protection
Bills, LAWFARE (Mar. 19, 2018, 8:30 AM), http://lawfareblog.com/its-time-congresspass-mueller-protection-bills.
200 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265-74 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (listing dozens of examples of qualifications or eligibility rules covering
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General be a “meet” person, meaning qualified or appropriate for the
job, “learned in the law.”201
Statutory qualifications or rules of eligibility take many different
forms, serving different purposes. Congress frequently specifies
qualifications for the heads of independent regulatory agencies or
bureaus, who are appointed by the President with Senate advice and
consent. Partisan balance requirements for multi-member
commissions or boards were noted above.202 Inspectors general must
be appointed “without regard to political affiliation.”203 Congress often
dictates that nominees have certain skills or experience.204 Sometimes
Congress requires that nominees not be current holders of any other
office under the United States.205 Sometimes it requires good
character.206 Sometimes a certain attitude toward the agency mission is

both inferior and principal officers).
201 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
202 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1), (5) (2018) (providing that, of the six voting
members who head the Federal Election Commission, “[n]o more than 3 members . . .
may be affiliated with the same political party,” and the chairman and vice chairman
“shall not be affiliated with the same political party”).
203 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (Appointment must be made “without regard to political
affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting,
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigations.”).
204 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (“The members of the [Merit System Protection Board]
shall be individuals who, by demonstrated ability, background, training, or experience
are especially qualified to carry out the functions of the Board.”); 12 U.S.C.
§ 4512(b)(1) (“The Director [of the Federal Housing Finance Agency] shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from
among individuals who are citizens of the United States, have a demonstrated
understanding of financial management or oversight, and have a demonstrated
understanding of capital markets, including the mortgage securities markets and
housing finance.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (“In making such appointments [to be
commissioners of the Consumer Products Safety Commission], the President shall
consider individuals who, by reason of their background and expertise in areas related
to consumer products and protection of the public from risks to safety, are qualified to
serve as members of the Commission.”).
205 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(3) (“Members [of the Federal Election
Commission] . . . shall be individuals who, at the time appointed to the Commission,
are not elected or appointed officers or employees in the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Federal Government.”).
206 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (requiring that inspector general appointments be made
“without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigations”); see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(3)
(requiring that members of the FEC “be chosen on the basis of their experience,
integrity, impartiality, and good judgment”).
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prescribed.207 Geographic and industry-background requirements are
sometimes imposed on multi-member agency heads.208
Even the heads of some purely executive agencies have
qualifications prescribed by Congress. The Secretary of Defense must
be “appointed from civilian life by the President,” and be at least seven
years removed from active duty in the armed forces.209 The Director of
National Intelligence “shall have extensive national security
expertise.”210 The U.S. Trade Representative, whose office is located
within the Executive Office of the President, may not have previously
represented or advised a foreign entity in a trade dispute with the
United States.211 The head of the Federal Aviation Administration
must be “a civilian; and . . . have experience in a field directly related
to aviation.”212 And a number of offices just below the top of purely
executive agencies also have statutory qualifications or eligibility rules.
For instance, the general counsels of the Central Intelligence Agency
and Department of Defense must be “appointed from civilian life.”213
The constitutional law on statutory qualifications for executive
officers is generous toward congressional regulation. Appointments to
federal executive office are, in the first instance, governed by the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Clause provides:
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they

207 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 633(b)(1) (“The management of the [Small Business]
Administration shall be vested in an Administrator who shall be appointed from
civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
who shall be a person of outstanding qualifications known to be familiar and
sympathetic with small-business needs and problems.”).
208 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 241 (“In selecting the members of the [Federal Reserve]
Board, not more than one of whom shall be selected from any one Federal Reserve
district, the President shall have due regard to a fair representation of the financial,
agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the
country.”).
209 10 U.S.C. § 113(a).
210 50 U.S.C. § 3023(a)(1).
211 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a), (b)(4).
212 49 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2)-(3).
213 10 U.S.C. § 140(a); 50 U.S.C. § 3520(a).
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think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.214
All officials who “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States” are Officers of the United States “and must,
therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by” the
Appointments Clause.215
The Clause makes a distinction between “inferior officers” and what
are called principal officers. “By vesting the President with the
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the
United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional
encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches.”216 The
check of Senate advice and consent “serves both to curb Executive
abuses of the appointment power, and ‘to promote a judicious choice
of [persons] for filling the offices of the union.’”217
Modern doctrine on appointment qualifications appears to be that,
while Congress may not give itself a direct role in appointing
executive officials who will be wielding executive power,218 reasonable
and relevant statutory qualifications or eligibility for senior executive
officers, whether principal or inferior, are constitutional. The Supreme
Court does not have a merits holding on the issue.219 So “[t]here is no
settled constitutional rule that determines how . . . the power of the
Congress to prescribe qualifications and the power of the President to
214

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1994) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)).
216 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
217 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 386-87 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloff
ed., 1987)). The Court has not always been very clear about where the line between
principal and inferior officers lies. See id. at 661 (“Our cases have not set forth an
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for
Appointments Clause purposes.”). This line is most important if Congress has
provided a means of appointment other than by the President with Senate advice and
consent — this is unconstitutional unless the officer is inferior. In addition to looking
at the jurisdiction, powers, and tenure of an officer, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 671-72 (1988), the Court has also announced that the primary marker of inferior
officer status is subordination: “[W]e think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond, 520 U.S.
at 663.
218 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
219 See Matthew A. Samberg, Note, “Established by Law”: Saving Statutory
Limitations on Presidential Appointments from Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1735, 1737 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never examined the practice of
restricting by statute the President’s choice of nominees for federal offices . . . .”).
215
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appoint . . . are to be reconciled.”220 But in Myers v. United States, one
of its most formalist, pro-executive decisions on separation of powers
and presidential control over senior executive officials, the Court
noted in dicta:
To Congress under its legislative power is given the
establishment of offices, the determination of their functions
and jurisdiction, the prescribing of reasonable and relevant
qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees, and the
fixing of the term for which they are to be appointed . . . all
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.221
The only limitation — besides reasonableness and relevance — that
the Myers Court indicated was that the qualifications and rules of
eligibility “do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive
choice as to be in effect legislative designation.”222
More recently, Justice Scalia’s famous dissent in the independent
counsel case did not take issue with Congress having prescribed
qualifications for the office.223 And a concurring opinion by Justice
Stevens in another major separation of powers case drew no objection
from other justices when it stated that “it is entirely proper for
Congress to specify the qualifications for an office that it has
created.”224
220

Judges — Appointment — Age Factor, 3 Op. O.L.C. 388, 389 (1979).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926).
222 Id. at 126.
223 See e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706-07 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For the statutory language at issue in Morrison, see 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (expired
1999) (“The division of the court shall appoint as independent counsel an individual
who has appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any
prosecution in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner. . . . The division of
the court may not appoint as an independent counsel any person who holds any office
of profit or trust under the United States.”).
224 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 740 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). There are
a few sources perhaps hinting at exclusivity of presidential control over appointments,
but which do not address the question in the context of congressional regulation. See,
e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“No role whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a
whole in the process of choosing the person who will be nominated for
appointment.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 456-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“In the act of nomination, [the President’s] judgment alone would
be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the
approbation of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as
complete as if he were to make the final appointment.”); James Monroe, Message to
the Senate of the United States (Apr. 13, 1822), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 698, 701 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908) (“[A]s a
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In separation of powers cases, the Court often gives weight to wellentrenched practices accepted by both Presidents and Congresses.225
There have now been over two centuries of practice in which Congress
has imposed a very wide range of qualifications and rules of eligibility
on executive appointments and the executive branch has, with very
few exceptions, complied with them, starting in 1789. Precedents
established by the first Congress have been found highly persuasive on
the original understanding of the Constitution “since many of the
Members of the First Congress had taken part in framing that
instrument.”226 The Court has also applied this principle to other early
Congresses.227
Notwithstanding the strong doctrinal and customary case for
constitutionality, the modern executive branch and some scholars
have questioned the constitutionality of some or all qualifications or
eligibility rules for executive officials, whether principal or inferior.
Some Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) or Attorney General opinions
have conceded the constitutionality of qualifications so long as they
are reasonable and relevant and do not “rul[e] out a large portion of
those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill a
particular office.”228 President Clinton and his OLC objected to the
statutory qualification for the appointment of a U.S. trade
representative — never having represented a foreign entity in a trade
dispute against the United States — because it ruled out a large

general principle . . . Congress ha[s] no right under the Constitution to impose any
restraint by law on the power granted to the President so as to prevent his making a
free selection of proper persons for these offices from the whole body of his fellow
citizens.”).
225 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (“Long settled
and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of
constitutional provisions regulating the relationship between Congress and the
President.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“‘[T]raditional ways
of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution.” (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring))).
226 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723-24; accord Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
227 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
228 Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act 2007, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1742, 1742-43 (Oct. 4, 2006);
Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointment of U.S. Trade Representative, 20
Op. O.L.C. 279, 280 (1996); see also Military Acad. —Appointment — Statutory
Construction, 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 341, 343 (1905); Civil Serv. Comm’n, 13 Op. Att’y
Gen. 516, 520-21, 525 (1871).
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number of otherwise-desirable candidates.229 And both the executive
branch and some scholars have questioned the constitutionality of
partisan balance requirements for multi-member commissions or
boards heading independent agencies.230
Sometimes the executive has taken a harder line on all qualifications
for executive officers. During the Carter administration, OLC
“question[ed] the validity of the requirement” in a bill establishing
inspectors general in executive agencies “that the President appoint
each Inspector General ‘without regard to political affiliation’” because
“[t]his implies some limitation on the appointment power in addition
to the advice and consent of the Senate.”231 The implication that any
limitation on the appointment power is unconstitutional is, frankly,
hard to take seriously. OLC reiterated this extreme view during the
George H.W. Bush administration.232
A few commentators join these executive opinions in finding some
exclusive and illimitable power in the Appointments Clause for the
President to choose any candidate he or she desires. But these
arguments contradict constitutional practice since 1789, and
furthermore do not agree on key issues such as whether their theory of
total presidential discretion applies to appointment of principal
officers, inferior officers, or both.233 In my estimation, there is very
wide room for Congress to prescribe qualifications or rules of
eligibility without crossing the line of unconstitutionality.234
Building on proposals made during the 1970s reform period, and
language in some current statutes, I suggest a number of different
statutory provisions and the comment on their likely constitutionality.
229 See Statute Governing Appointment, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 279-80; Presidential
Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1907, 1907
(Dec. 19, 1995).
230 BREGER & EDLES, supra note 46, at 96-97.
231 Inspector Gen. Legislation, 1 Op. O.L.C. 16, 18 n.3 (1977), 1977 WL 18011.
232 See Common Legislative Encroachments on Exec. Branch Authority, 13 Op.
O.L.C. 248, 250 (1989), 1989 WL 595833.
233 Compare Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory
Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 746 (2008) (arguing “that
statutory requirements are unconstitutional for all appointments that require the
advice and consent of the Senate”), with Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive
Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 53435 (1998) (arguing that statutory qualifications for inferior officers are
unconstitutional, and that statutory qualifications for principal officers are sometimes
unconstitutional and sometimes not).
234 See also E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power Over Office Creation, 128
YALE L.J. 166, 201-05 (2018) (arguing primarily on textual and structural grounds for
very broad authority of Congress to prescribe qualifications for offices).
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Good Character

Similar to provisions for the Federal Election Commission and
inspectors general within agencies, Congress could require that the
most senior DOJ officials — the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney
General, Associate Attorney General, Solicitor General, FBI Director,
or U.S. Attorneys — have demonstrated “integrity, impartiality, and
good judgment.” I cannot imagine a valid constitutional objection to
such a statute. It certainly might be objected that such qualifications
are so vague as to be useless. I will not argue that the proposal would
be significantly impactful, but it does seem plausible to say that it
would give the Senate during confirmation hearings, as well as the
press and public, a useful — if admittedly very vague — measuring
stick with which to interrogate the character and career of nominees.
2.

Law Enforcement Experience

The officials who head DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys offices have jobs
which range beyond criminal law enforcement, and so a rigid
requirement that they possess law enforcement experience would be
unwise. But the FBI directorship is different. Law enforcement is a
primary mission, alongside the intelligence functions. Requiring some
law enforcement experience seems relevant and reasonable.
In 1973, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson proposed a bill that would
have required the FBI Director to have “extensive professional
experience in the field of law enforcement of and at least 10 years of
experience in a responsible position with the FBI itself.”235 This seems
too rigid to me, both as a policy matter and under the relevant
constitutional test, because it would drastically restrict the pool of
candidates the President could choose from. No FBI Director in
history, acting or permanent, met Jackson’s requirement of ten years’
prior experience at a senior level of the Bureau.
But a statute that, for example, required “experience in the field of
criminal justice” seems reasonable and almost certainly constitutional.
In theory, it reduces the President’s pool of potential candidates
significantly, but in reality the limitation is very mild. All acting and
confirmed Bureau directors in the post-Hoover era — totaling fifteen
people — met the qualification I proposed, through service either in
law enforcement, as a prosecutor or Department of Justice supervisor,
or as a judge with criminal jurisdiction. So looking at the pool a
President would (or should) be actually choosing from, there is not
235
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much restriction at all. In that case, it might be superfluous to pass a
statute requiring something that modern Presidents have always done
voluntarily. My response is the same as above: it would not hurt and it
might help. Since the FBI has dramatically increased its intelligence
mission since 9/11, it probably also would make sense for Congress to
stipulate that the Bureau’s director have national security experience
as well.
3.

Appointment Without Regard to Political Affiliation

I suggested above that one of the norms which emerged from the
1970s was that the job of Attorney General involves such a large
element of policy choice that it is appropriate for Presidents to select
someone who will reflect their own policy views.236 For that reason, I
will not propose that the DOJ’s senior leadership should be required to
be chosen without regard to their political affiliation.
But the cases of the FBI Director and, arguably, U.S. Attorneys are
different. While it is proper for the President to want an FBI Director
who will be “responsive[] to the broad policies of the Executive
Branch,”237 Congress’s decision to set a ten-year term on the office —
longer than any one President may serve — clearly indicates the
congressional view that the Director has “non-political . . .
responsibilities” and is “not an ordinary Cabinet appointment which is
usually considered a politically oriented member of the President’s
‘team.’”238 This norm has widespread support.239 Given this choice,
which was acquiesced in by the executive branch from 1976 until the
Trump presidency, Congress could consider going one step further and
directing that, like inspectors general already, the FBI Director be
appointed “without regard to political affiliation.” Cross-partisan
appointments of FBI Directors have historically been a very strong
signal of presidential commitment to law enforcement independence.240
Requiring cross-partisanship by statute might go too far in constraining
the President’s choices, but requiring that the holder of an inherently

236

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 2 (1974).
238 Id. at 2-3.
239 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
240 Bill Clinton appointed Republican Louis Freeh to be FBI Director in 1993.
Barack Obama appointment two Republicans to the Bureau, first by seeking
congressional approval for extending the term of Robert Mueller, who had been first
appointed by President George W. Bush, and second by appointing James Comey.
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nonpolitical job be selected without regard to politics is likely to be
found a reasonable and relevant qualification, and hence constitutional.
U.S. Attorneys may be a somewhat harder case. Congress has
recognized the right of Presidents to have their preferred nominees in
that job by giving them a four-year term in office to match the
Presidents and by expressly providing that “[e]ach United States
attorney is subject to removal by the President.”241 But, unlike DOJ
leadership in Washington, the core job of U.S. Attorneys is to
prosecute and defend specific criminal and civil cases.242 As discussed
above, the norm is that specific-party matters should always be
conducted in an apolitical and impartial manner, and nearly always in
a way that is independent of the White House or other politicallyresponsive actors. In my view, required non-partisan appointment of
U.S. Attorneys would likely be constitutional.
4.

Barring Cronies or Politically Active Persons from Senior DOJ
Roles

Responding to the perceived politicization of the DOJ, some 1970s
reformers proposed barring persons who had worked on presidential
campaigns from serving in senior leadership roles in the
Department.243 For years there had been grumbling that senior
presidential campaign aides and longstanding political or personal
friends of the President — for example, Homer Cummings for
President Roosevelt, Howard McGrath for President Truman, Herbert
Brownell, Jr., for President Eisenhower, and Robert Kennedy for
President Kennedy — were being given the extremely sensitive and
important job of Attorney General of the United States.244 The
Watergate experience and criminal conviction of Nixon’s first two
Attorneys General, Joseph Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst,
crystallized these complaints. Both had heavily political backgrounds,
and Mitchell was also a longstanding friend and law partner of the
President he served.
It was not unnoticed that a number of the more respected Attorneys
General during this era — Robert Jackson, Francis Biddle, Tom Clark,
William Rogers, and Nicholas Katzenbach — tended to have much
more minimal experience in electoral politics and less close,
241

28 U.S.C. § 541(b)-(c) (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 547.
243 See 121 CONG. REC. 13303 (1975) (introduced by Sen. Bentsen).
244 See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 13302 (1975) (statement of Sen. Bentsen); Removing
Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 2-3 (opening statement of Sen. Ervin).
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confidential relationships with the President before coming into the
office.
In 1967, responding to the Kennedy experience, Congress enacted
an anti-nepotism statute which bars the President (and other officials)
from appointing relatives “to a civilian position in [an] agency” which
the appointing official serves in, controls, or has jurisdiction over.245
Executive agencies and departments, and independent regulatory
agencies, are covered by the statute.246 More limits on appointments,
specifically at the DOJ, were also proposed in the aftermath of
Watergate.
In 1975, the final report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force
recommended that the Attorney General and other senior DOJ
appointees not be confirmed by the Senate if the nominee had served
“as a President’s campaign manager or in a similar high-level campaign
role.”247 A special committee of the American Bar Association, tasked
with studying how to remove improper political influence on federal
law enforcement, made a similar proposal, stating that Congress
should legislate to prevent a person who had held “the position of
campaign manager [for the President-elect], chairman of the finance
committee, chairman of the national political party, or other high level
campaign role involved in electing the President” from serving as AG
or DAG.248
Senator Lloyd Bentsen (Democrat from Texas) in 1975 introduced
the Justice Department Reform Act. Lamenting that the trend of
President’s appointing senior political campaign advisers “contributes
to a growing perception of the Justice Department as a political
instrument,”249 he proposed barring people who held senior positions
on the presidential campaign staff or in state or national political party
organizations be banned from nomination by the President they served
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5 U.S.C. § 3110(b).
Id. § 3110(a)(1)(A) (defining “agency” as an “Executive agency”); 5 U.S.C.
§ 105 (“For the purpose of this title, ‘Executive agency’ means an Executive
department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.”). The
White House, supported by the Office of Legal Counsel in the DOJ, has taken the
position, as a matter of statutory construction, that appointments to the White House
staff are not covered by this statute. See Application of the Anti-Nepotism Statute to a
Presidential Appointment in the White House Office, Op. O.L.C. (Jan. 20, 2017), 2017
WL 5653623. To my knowledge the statute’s constitutionality has not been
questioned.
247 U.S. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 136 (1975).
248 ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 38.
249 121 CONG. REC. 13303 (1975) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
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for Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney
General, and Solicitor General.250
This bill did not make it out of the Judiciary Committee, but
Bentsen kept pushing the concept as amendments to other
legislation.251 Eventually the Senate, with bipartisan approval and no
need for a roll call, adopted a revised version as an amendment to
what became the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.252
Although the Bentsen amendment dealt with a Senate prerogative —
consideration of executive nominations — the House stripped it out
during the House-Senate conference process.253 It may well have been
thought by some members of Congress that, for good or ill, Presidents
needed to be free to choose their own person for such an important
role as Attorney General.254 Likely some momentum in favor of the
Bentsen reform was lost because since Watergate, President Ford had
appointed the universally-respected, apolitical, and independent
Edward Levi, president of the University of Chicago, to be his attorney
general,255 and President Carter had appointed a well-respected former
judge, Griffin Bell.256 During the 1976 campaign, candidate Carter
promised an “independent” DOJ, going so far as to propose that
Attorneys General serve a five-year term, so that it not be coterminous
with the President’s.257 It probably seemed that the lesson had been
250

Id. (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 6195-98 (1976) (debate on Sen. Bentsen’s proposed
amendment to Federal Employees Political Activity Act).
252 See 123 CONG. REC. 20974 (1977) (The Senate adopted the following
amendment: “An individual who has played a leading partisan role in the election of a
President shall not be appointed Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.
Individuals holding the position of national campaign manager, national chairman of
the finance committee, chairman of the national political party, or other comparable
high-level campaign role involved in electing the President should be those considered
to have played a leading partisan role.”).
253 See Nomination of Edwin Meese III to be Attorney General of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter
Nomination of Edwin Meese III] (opening statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum
recounting this history).
254 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 6197 (1976) (making this point during debate of a
similar Bentsen amendment).
255 See generally Larry D. Kramer, Foreword to RESTORING JUSTICE: THE SPEECHES OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWARD H. LEVI, at xii-xiii (Jack Fuller ed., 2013) (discussing
Levi’s role in restoring credibility and independence to the DOJ after the nadir of
Watergate).
256 See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Griffin Boyette Bell, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 1976),
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/21/archives/griffin-boyette-bell.html
(discussing
Bell’s biography).
257 GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 28 (1982).
251
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learned and a new, positive norm of Attorney General independence
from politics and the White House instantiated.258
But in retrospect, the new direction of independence for Attorneys
General from politics and White House influence was short-lived. For
example, William French Smith, Reagan’s first attorney general, was
the personal lawyer, business advisor, and close political confidante of
Reagan dating back to the early 1960s.259 Edwin Meese, who replaced
Smith in 1985, had served in political roles for Governor Reagan from
1967–1974, and was chief of staff of the 1980 presidential campaign,
“counselor to the president” during the first term, and was a close
friend of Reagan.260 Senate Democrats opposed Meese for a variety of
reasons, including violation of the principle of the Bentsen
amendment, which had been agreed to by senators by both parties
only seven years previously.261
Since then, some Attorneys General have been partisan political
figures or presidential cronies (for example, Alberto Gonzales,
Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III), while others have had more
independent and apolitical biographies prior to assuming the office
(for example, Janet Reno and Loretta Lynch).262 The record of
Attorneys General with partisan backgrounds is somewhat mixed,
because some demonstrated real independence in office (for example,
John Ashcroft). Cronies — such as Mitchell or Meese — seem to have
been more likely to be disappointing in office.
It would be useful for Congress to debate and consider a version of
the Bentsen amendment for the Attorney General and perhaps Deputy
and Associate Attorneys General also; I will not prejudge where that
debate should end up.
I see the FBI Director as being differently situated, however.
Compared to the Attorney General’s job, the FBI Directorship has
been and should remain substantially less political and less tied to the
258 See Joseph Kraft, The Rising of Lowered Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/03/archives/the-rising-of-lowered-expectationsone-year-of-ford-ford.html (noting that Levi was “the first Attorney General in 50
years who does not come from a heavily political background”).
259 CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 51-52 (1992); Edward J. Boyer, William French Smith, 73,
Dies; Reagan Adviser and Atty. Gen., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-30/local/me-3410_1_william-french-smith.
260 See CLAYTON, supra note 259, at 51-52.
261 See Nomination of Edwin Meese III, supra note 253, at 7.
262 See
Attorneys General of the United States, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios (providing brief biographies of attorneys
general).
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White House. Precluding political campaign aides or recently-active
politicians from heading the Bureau seems highly relevant to reducing
the possibility for actual or perceived politicization of law
enforcement. No Senate confirmed FBI Director in history would have
been excluded from consideration by such a rule. No permanent
director of the FBI has ever held elective office, been a senior aide on a
presidential campaign, or a close friend or confidante of the
appointing President. Two acting directors had brief careers in state
legislatures long before their temporary service at the head of the
Bureau. The disgraced Patrick Gray, acting FBI Director under Nixon,
had worked on Nixon’s 1968 campaign and been rewarded with
appointment as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division.263
This record strikes me as good evidence that the suggested
qualifications would not be unduly restrictive but could screen out
people who have no business being FBI Director.
B. Removal: Good-Cause Limitation on the President’s Power to Remove
the FBI Director
The Supreme Court and most scholars agree that at-will tenure at
the President’s pleasure makes agency heads and other senior
executive officials more susceptible to White House direction and
control,264 and that the converse is also true — limiting the President’s
power to dismiss is an effective check on White House direction and
control.265 There are many ways Congress can limit the President’s
ability to remove senior executive officials. The most effective and
aggressive technique is to specify by statute a for-cause requirement
before removal may occur, like the provision in the organic statutes of
many independent agencies.266 A common formulation recites that
263

RICHARD GID POWERS, BROKEN: THE TROUBLED PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF
298 (2004).
264 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483
(2010) (stating that at-will removal power allows the President to keep executive
officers “accountable” to him); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958)
(discussing “the Damocles’ sword of removal by the President”); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (“[I]t is quite evident that one who holds his
office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an
attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”).
265 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 501, 513-14; cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 726 (1986) (“Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can
remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the
performance of his functions, obey.”).
266 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018) (concerning commissioners of the Federal Trade
Commission).
THE FBI
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agency heads may not be removed by the President except for
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”267 This directly
confronts the President with a congressional restriction on his
constitutional powers over the executive branch personnel. This kind
of statutory restriction on removal is frequently said to be the most
important marker of agency independence.268
A second possibility is a wrinkle on the first: for Congress to require
notice and a hearing, either administrative or judicial, on whether
good cause for removal is present before removal may occur.269 A
milder version of this — a third possibility — is to require, upon
removal, a public statement of reasons.270 This requirement is
obviously intended to disincentivize removals other than for publiclyacceptable good causes.
A fourth possibility is exemplified by the now-lapsed independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Congress
there provided that the Attorney General, not the President, could
remove the independent counsel and “only for good cause, physical or
mental disability . . . or any other condition that substantially impairs
the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.”271 A fifth
option is to specify a term of years for which the official may hold the
office. Early on, it was thought that such a statutory term precluded
the President from removing the official prior to the term’s
expiration.272 (Note that impeachment and removal by Congress is
always an option for removing an executive officer.) But later in the
nineteenth century, the Court held that only “very clear and explicit
language” in a statute limiting removal could overcome the
presumption that the President’s constitutional power to remove at-
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See, e.g., id.
Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1165, 1168 (citing examples).
269 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153 (“Any member of the [National Labor Relations]
Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”).
270 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. app. 3, § 3(b) (“An Inspector General may be removed from
office by the President. If an Inspector General is removed from office or is transferred
to another position or location within an establishment, the President shall
communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses
of Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”).
271 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (lapsed 1999).
272 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803) (implying that the
five-year statutory term of a Washington DC justice of the peace made the official
unremovable by the President); see also JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 105-06 (2017) (noting that the
Marbury Court’s claim did not appear to have been contemporaneously disputed).
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will was unimpaired.273 Even if a term of years is not a legal
impediment to removal, it can be part of a sixth congressional
strategy: to signal to the President that removal except for good cause
would be disfavored, and could lead to costly political backlash, such
as difficulty confirming a successor, without imposing any legal bar on
removal. This was how Congress approached the position of the FBI
Director in the 1970s;274 Congress’s un-enacted policy preference
stuck until 2017, when President Trump decided to fire FBI Director
Comey.
In the following subsections, I review congressional debates and
proposals in the 1970s about how to preserve independence of the FBI
Director, and then evaluate the constitutionality of a requirement that
the FBI Director may be fired by the President only for good cause.
1.

Congressional Debates in the 1970s About FBI Director
Independence

Congress considered statutory reform of the FBI starting in 1973.
Reformers focused on lengthening the tenure of the FBI Director and
imposing statutory removal restrictions. A lengthy but definite term
would allow the director to accumulate experience, without
perpetuating him- or herself in office the way Hoover did as Director.
A term longer than that which any President might serve would both
symbolically and practically remove the director somewhat from
political whirlwinds.275
In April 1973, Senator Robert Byrd, the Democratic Majority Whip,
introduced The Federal Bureau of Investigation Improvement Act.276
The bill established the FBI “as an independent establishment of the
273 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1903); see also Keim v. United
States, 177 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1900) (“In the absence of a specific provision to the
contrary, the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment.”); Parsons v.
United States, 167 U.S. 324, 327-28, 342 (1897) (declining, because it would raise
constitutional issues, to read a statutory four-year term for a U.S. Attorney to limit the
President’s power to remove mid-term).
274 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 6 (1974) (proposing a ten-year term for the FBI
Director and stating that “[t]he bill is a cautionary message to the President to the
effect that whereas his power to remove a Director of the FBI is formally unlimited,
nevertheless, by virtue of its power to ratify the appointment of a successor, the Senate
retains a large measure of influence over this removal power and will tolerate its
exercise for good reason only”).
275 See id. at 2, 4; Ten-Year Term for FBI Director: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
FBI Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 3 (Mar. 18, 1974) (statement
of Sen. Byrd).
276 119 CONG. REC. 11351-52 (1973).
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executive branch,” headed by a Director who was appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate to a nonrenewable seven-year term.277 Nothing was said about removal. Byrd’s
bill would have taken the director out from under the supervision of
the Attorney General.278
The same day as Byrd acted Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop”
Jackson of Washington, introduced a bill that left the FBI as a
component of the DOJ, and granted the director a non-renewable
fifteen-year term, after being appointed by the President with advice
and consent of the Senate.279 The Jackson bill provided that the
President could remove the director “for only the following reasons:
permanent incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, any
felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.”280
The next month, Senator Richard Schweiker, a progressive
Pennsylvania Republican, introduced a third FBI reform bill. Like
Byrd’s bill, it too made the FBI a separate “independent” agency.281
Like Jackson’s, it restricted removal.282 The removal section had a
proviso that “[f]ailure to follow a directive from any member of the
executive branch or legislative branch shall not constitute grounds for
removal from office unless such failure constitutes a dereliction of the
lawful duties of the Director or Deputy Director.”283 Appointment was
by the President with Senate advice and consent. Splitting the
difference between Byrd’s seven years and Jackson’s fifteen, Schweiker
proposed that the director serve a non-renewable ten-year term.284
The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected these proposals, however,
except for the idea of giving the director a single, lengthy, nonrenewable term. There were two prominent reasons why it was
reluctant to directly insulate the director from removal. One was the
desire to prevent another Hoover — an effectively unremovable
director who amassed power over time and abused the office.285 The
Constitution was a second reason that a statutory limit on the
277

Id.
Id.
279 Id. at 11353.
280 Id.
281 119 CONG. REC. 14131-32 (1973).
282 Id. at 14131 (“The President shall remove the Director or Deputy Director from
office, prior to the expiration of their respective terms, for malfeasance in office,
neglect of their duties, or permanent incapacity.”).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 See S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 2 (1974).
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President’s removal authority was rejected by the Senate. Under
Supreme Court precedent, the Committee thought it “highly likely”
that the FBI Director was “within the class of officials subject to the
President’s illimitable power of removal.”286 The Myers case from 1926
rejected any congressional participation in the removal of highranking executive officers as unconstitutional restraints on the
“executive power” granted by Article II.287 And the Humphrey’s
Executor case from 1935 only partially qualified that rule. It upheld
good-cause removal restrictions for the commissioners heading the
Federal Trade Commission, which had “quasi-legislative” (rulemaking) and “quasi-judicial” (adjudicative) powers, in addition to
powers to investigate and prosecute civilly violations of federal law.288
But the Court held that Congress could not restrict the President’s
right to remove any “purely executive” officers.289 Believing that the
FBI Director exercised “purely executive” powers, Congress gave the
FBI Director a non-renewable ten-year term but did not attempt to
legislate any removal restrictions.290 It was thought that the long term
in office, spanning more years than a single President could serve,
would sufficiently insulate the FBI Director from too much White
House control.291
Statutory restrictions on the removal of the FBI Director continued
to be proposed through the end of the Carter presidency, but none
became law. For instance, in 1980 Senate Republicans, including
Orrin Hatch of Utah and Paul Laxalt of Nevada, introduced a bill to
establish a legislative charter for the FBI, which would have created a
comprehensive set of rules governing what the FBI could and could

286

Id. at 6.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926). The statute at issue
provided: “Postmasters of the first, second and third classes shall be appointed and
may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended
according to law.” Id. at 107.
288 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935).
289 Id. at 628, 631-32.
290 See Andrew Kent, Susan Hennessey & Matthew Kahn, Why Did Congress Set a
Ten-Year Term for the FBI Director?, LAWFARE (May 17, 2017, 4:45 PM),
www.lawfareblog.com/why-did-congress-set-ten-year-term-fbi-director
[hereinafter
Why Did Congress Set a Ten-Year Term]; see also Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-503, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (“[T]he term of service of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be ten years. A Director may not serve more than
one ten-year term.”).
291 See Kent, Hennessey & Kahn, Why Did Congress Set a Ten-Year Term, supra
note 290.
287
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not do.292 The bill left the director to be appointed to a ten-year term
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate, but specified
that removal could occur “only for gross neglect of the duties of the
office or malfeasance in office.”293
As a result of the decision by Congress in the 1970s not to impose
removal restrictions, it has been only norms of FBI independence that
have prevented Presidents from treating the director like an at-will
employee.294
2.

Constitutionality of Removal Restrictions

If Congress wanted to take dramatic action to protect the FBI from
White House interference, it could adopt a version of the Jackson,
Schweiker or Hatch/Laxalt proposals — barring the President from
removing the director except for good cause. Was the Senate Judiciary
Committee in the 1970s correct that this would be unconstitutional?
There is a vast literature on presidential versus congressional control
over removal of senior executive officials. This Article will not attempt
a comprehensive resolution of this debate, but will instead sketch an
argument for the constitutionality of a removal restriction, while
noting places where the contrary argument is strongest.
I will address the following components of constitutional argument:
text and original understanding, customary practice of the government
over time, and Supreme Court doctrine.
a.

Text and Original Understanding

Besides the impeachment mechanism, there is no express provision
in the Constitution granting a power to remove executive officers.
Removal of executive officials was not discussed during the
Philadelphia Convention,295 but received extensive consideration early
in the First Congress, in a great debate later known later as the
“Decision of 1789.”296 The variety of views expressed was wide —
292

126 CONG. REC. 18558-62 (1980).
Id. at 18559.
294 Cf. COMEY, supra note 24, at 236-37 (recounting a conversation with President
Trump in which the President implied that Comey retaining his job as FBI Director
required a pledge of personal loyalty to Trump).
295 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109-10 (1926) (noting that the “removal of
executive officials was not discussed during the Philadelphia Convention”).
296 Id. at 111-36, 149 (recounting the 1789 debate behind the decision to “strik[e]
out . . . the clause recognizing and affirming the unrestricted power of the President to
remove” in detail).
293
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ranging from total presidential control, to shared power between the
President and Senate, to congressional control via the Necessary and
Proper Clause.297 Ultimately, by narrow margins in both Houses, a bill
was passed which has been commonly — but not universally —
understood to express the view that the default power to remove
executive officials lies with the President, not the Senate nor the
President plus Senate acting jointly. All agreed that removal is also
possible by impeachment.298 No definitive view was expressed on
Congress’s ability to qualify or limit removal. In the antebellum
period, the Supreme Court noted the “great diversity of opinion”
expressed during the 1789 debate, and accepted Congress’s “practical
construction of the Constitution” holding that the power to remove
(except via impeachment) executive officers appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate is “vested in the
President alone.”299
Some scholars, including Steven Calabresi, Christopher Yoo, and
Saikrishna Prakash, have advanced a view of the text, structure, and
original understanding of the Constitution that is called the “unitary
executive” theory. As Gillian Metzger recently explained, “[u]nitary
executive scholars claim that Article II’s hierarchy requires broad
presidential authority to control all executive-branch decisionmaking
or at least at-will presidential removal power over those executing
federal law.”300 As noted above, this view was by no means universally
held among members of the Founding generation.
Some scholars opposed to the unitary executive view, including
Cass Sunstein, Larry Lessig, and Harold Krent, have contended that
federal criminal prosecutions in the early Republic were not under the
hierarchical control of the President.301 Unitary executive scholarship
297 Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 234-35 (1989).
298 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
299 In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259 (1839).
300 Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1880 (2015). For leading academic accounts of unitary executive theory, see, for
example, STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3-4 (2008); SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH,
IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 35-42,
61, 66-68 (2015); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power
To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 passim (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1153, 1165-68 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary
Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1003, 1006 (2007).
301 See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
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has rebutted this to some extent, showing that Presidents Washington,
Adams, and Jefferson expressed and acted on a belief that federal
criminal prosecutors (federal district attorneys) answered to them,
were removable from office at will, and could have their prosecutorial
discretion overridden by the President.302 This practical construction
of the Constitution by early Presidents is certainly entitled to great
weight in assessing the original understanding. Out of deference to
this history, as well as for reasons of policy,303 this Article does not
propose any restrictions on the President’s power to remove the
Attorney General or U.S. Attorneys.
But the FBI Director has no power to prosecute, and thus may be
differently situated as a constitutional matter. The FBI investigates
crimes and gathers intelligence. No scholar has comprehensively
examined whether the criminal investigation function was understood
by the Founding generation to be within the illimitable control of the
President. Following Justice Scalia, the leading proponent of unitary
executive views, the assumption has been that investigation has the
same constitutional status as prosecution. Scalia’s famous dissent in
the independent counsel case, Morrison v. Olson, stated that “the
conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide
whether to prosecute)” is an exercise of “purely” and “quintessentially
executive activity.”304 Those functions, he wrote, had “always and
everywhere — if conducted by government at all — been conducted
never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the
executive.”305
As to criminal investigation, at least, Justice Scalia was mistaken. In
England, the American colonies, and the American states post-1776,
criminal investigation functions were performed by a mix of private
individuals, grand juries (private individuals serving temporarily
under judicial supervision), judicial officers, and traditional law
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1994);
Daniel N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence:
The Preeminent Executive, 53 ALB. L. REV. 49, 56-60 (1988); see also Susan Low Bloch,
The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning
There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 563 (1989); William B. Gwyn, The
Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
474, 476, 492-93 (1989).
302 Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 527, 55263 (2005).
303 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
304 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
305 Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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enforcement officers who would be considered “executive.”306 The
executive officers were probably the least important of the bunch in
terms of investigative functions. Nothing resembling a modern police
agency existed. Thus, when the Constitution conveyed “executive
power” to the President, it is unlikely that this was understood by the
Founding generation to grant the President comprehensive, illimitable
authority over all persons investigating federal crimes. And in fact, the
English-colonial model continued for some time under the new federal
government. In the early Republic period, a mix of private individuals
(witnesses, crime victims, or relatives of crime victims), grand jurors,
federal and state judges, qui tam relators, and state and federal
executive officers participated in the investigation of federal crimes.307
Only federal executive officers were removable by the President, or by
someone who was an at-will employee of the President.
b.

Customary Practice

Since its creation, the head of the FBI has been removable at-will —
as a formal legal matter — by first the Attorney General and now the
President.308 What constitutional weight this longstanding practice has
is somewhat uncertain, however. Because notwithstanding the formal
ability to fire for any reason, in practice Presidents have been greatly
constrained in their ability to remove the director. Director Hoover
was insulated in office by his popularity with the public and his
perceived possession of derogatory information on Presidents,
members of Congress, and others and his perceived willingness to
blackmail.309 Since Hoover, a different type of independence has
pertained. As noted above, a strong norm has developed that the FBI
Director should be responsive to broad policy priorities of the
President and Attorney General but independent when carrying out
specific functions of the Bureau.310 Freedom from partisan political
direction has gone without saying in the years since Watergate.
Since Hoover’s death, every confirmation hearing for a permanent
FBI Director has featured Senators and the nominees insisting that the
FBI remain an independent, professional, nonpartisan agency.311

306 See Andrew Kent, Investigation of Crime and the Original Meaning of Executive
Power (working paper).
307 See id.
308 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
309 See, e.g., RONALD KESSLER, THE SECRETS OF THE FBI (2012).
310 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
311 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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Frequently, nominees have stated that they sought and received
assurances from the President and Attorney General, before agreeing
to take the job, that they would have substantial independence.312 At
one FBI Director confirmation hearing, a senator suggested that the
director was so independent of the President that he “cannot be
removed except for cause.”313
Prior to President Trump removing Comey, only one Senateconfirmed director had been removed from office. After an extensive
administrative investigation initiated by the DOJ under President H.W.
Bush, President Clinton fired William Sessions because of accusations
of financial impropriety.314
Moreover, notwithstanding formal legal freedom to nominate
anyone they want for the job, Presidents since Nixon have selected
widely-respected, nonpartisan figures with substantial backgrounds in
law enforcement, as prosecutors or on the bench.315
All of this, as well as the backlash to the Comey firing, suggests that
political elites are broadly comfortable with the idea that the FBI be
headed by a director who is substantially independent from
presidential control. Whether or not this norm should, as a formal
matter, influence the analysis of the constitutionality of a statutory forcause removal restriction,316 as a practical matter judges seem likely to
be influenced by such a widespread norm.

312

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See Mueller Hearing, supra note 25, at 71 (statement of Sen. Specter).
314 See David Johnston, Defiant FBI Chief Removed from Job by the President, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/20/us/defiant-fbi-chiefremoved-from-job-by-the-president.html.
315 For biographies of Directors Clarence Kelley (1973–1978), William Webster
(1978–1987), William Sessions (1987–1993), and Louis Freeh (1993–2001), see THE
FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 327, 336-37, 352-53, 358-59 (Athan G.
Theoharis et al. eds., 1999). For the biography of Robert Mueller (2001–2013), see
Robert S. Mueller, III, September 4, 2001–September 4, 2013, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/
history/directors/robert-s-mueller-iii (last visited Dec. 8, 2018). For the biography of
James Comey (2013–2017), see James B. Comey, September 4, 2013–May 9, 2017, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/directors/james-b-comey (last visited Dec. 8, 2018). For
the biography of Christopher Wray (2017–), see Christopher Wray, August 2, 2017–
Present, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/directors/christopher-wray (last visited Dec.
8, 2018).
316 See Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, passim (examining the role
conventions that may play in judicial reasoning).
313

1990
c.

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1927

Supreme Court Doctrine

During the 1970s, it appeared clear that Supreme Court precedent
would have barred a statutory for-cause restriction on removing the
FBI Director. As described above, the doctrine of the Myers and
Humphrey’s Executor cases appeared to be that the removal of “purely
executive” officials cannot be restricted by Congress, but that
Congress could require good-cause for the removal of the heads of
independent regulatory commissions exercising quasi-legislative,
quasi-judicial, and executive powers.317 The Court’s reasoning for this
distinction was somewhat obscure. Myers had emphasized the
President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and
his or her need for accountability and control over subordinates who
assisted in law execution.318
Over the twentieth century, the powers delegated to independent
regulatory agencies continued to grow. Agencies with for-cause
removal protections for their heads have come to exercise significant
powers of investigation and civil prosecution.319 It has remained
conceptually unclear why conjoining law execution with rule-making
and adjudication functions within the same agency should diminish
the President’s removal power. Humphrey’s Executor did not purport to
explain this. And since the Constitution does not make any distinction
in Article II between civil and criminal law execution, the precedent of
these independent regulatory agencies — and the widespread view by
political and legal elites of their constitutionality320 — supports an
argument that there could be some for-cause removal protection for an
agency head with criminal investigative jurisdiction.
A half-century after Humphrey’s Executor, the Court in Morrison v.
Olson moved away from congressional intent to create a “quasilegislative” or “quasi-judicial” agency as the touchstone for the
317

See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132-33 (1926).
319 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2053(a), 2054(a)(2), 2061(a) & 2069 (2018) (providing
that commissioners of the Consumer Product Safety Commission have for-cause
removal protection and that the Commission may “conduct such . . . investigations of
deaths, injuries, diseases, other health impairments, and economic losses resulting
from accidents involving consumer products as it deems necessary” and represent
itself in court in civil enforcement actions); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1), (g) & (i)
(providing that commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have
for-cause removal protection and that the Commission may hold “hearings, sign and
issue subpenas [sic], administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence” and
represent itself in court in civil enforcement actions).
320 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1564-66 (2015) (reviewing
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)).
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constitutionality of removal restrictions. Morrison challenged the
constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978.321 This act was passed to address Nixon’s
interference with the Watergate criminal investigation.322 His
interference included the infamous Saturday Night Massacre, in which
Nixon fired the Attorney General and his deputy in order to find a
DOJ official (third in line Robert Bork) who was willing to fire special
counsel Archibald Cox. Cox had been appointed by the Attorney
General under newly-created DOJ regulations to oversee the criminal
investigation.323
The 1978 Act provided for the appointment of an independent
counsel to investigate and, if deemed necessary, prosecute highranking government officials — the President, Vice President, many
executive agency heads, senior White House and DOJ officials —
credibly accused of federal criminal wrongdoing.324 The Attorney
General was required by the Act to conduct a preliminary
investigation and, if he or she found “reasonable grounds” for
additional investigation or prosecution, refer the matter to a speciallyconstituted panel of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, who would appoint and define the
jurisdiction of an independent counsel.325 This independent counsel
would then have the full statutory authority of the Attorney General
and DOJ with regard to the matters within his or her jurisdiction.326
The counsel could be removed “only” by impeachment or “by the
personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause,
physical or mental disability . . . or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s
duties.”327 Judicial review of removal by the Attorney General was
authorized.328
321

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988).
Constance O’Keefe & Peter Safirstein, Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers,
and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and
Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 49
BROOK. L. REV. 113, 116-17 (1982).
323 See, e.g., id. at 116-18; KUTLER, supra note 65, at 406-14; OLSON, supra note 79,
at 117-19.
324 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1994), sunsetted by 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2018) (setting an
expiration date for 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq. on June 30, 1999 except for matters then
pending before an independent counsel).
325 Id. §§ 591-93 (lapsed 1999).
326 Id. § 594(a) (lapsed 1999).
327 Id. § 596(a)(1) (lapsed 1999).
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The Court by a vote of 7–1, with Justice Kennedy not participating
and Justice Scalia dissenting, upheld this statutory scheme in the face
of a variety of constitutional challenges on separation of powers
grounds. The Court upheld the appointment by reasoning that the
independent counsel was an inferior officer who, under the
Appointments Clause, could be appointed by either a department head
or by “the Courts of Law.”329 The counsel’s inferior officer status was
shown by, inter alia, being “subject to removal by a higher Executive
Branch official,” having only “certain, limited duties,” “limited in
jurisdiction,” “limited in tenure,” and no “authority to formulate
policy for the Government or the Executive Branch.”330
The statute’s prevention of the President from having any
supervisory role or removal authority required more discussion. All
justices assumed that investigating and prosecuting violations of
federal crimes were core “executive” functions.331 The Morrison Court
then simply rejected the apparent holding of Humphrey’s Executor that
only officials exercising “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial”
functions could be protected by statutory good-cause removal rules.332
The test, the Court held, should be instead whether good-cause
removal limitations for an official, even one exercising “purely
executive” powers, would still allow the President “to accomplish his
constitutional role.”333 According to the Court, “the real question is
whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede
the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to faithfully
execute the law.334 Several considerations were mentioned to support
the judgment that the statute was not unconstitutional: the limited
powers, jurisdiction, and tenure of the independent counsel; the fact
that the Attorney General, who could remove the independent counsel
for good cause, was an at-will employee of the President; and the fact
that the Court had long tolerated under Humphrey’s Executor
independent agency “exercise [of] civil enforcement powers that are
analogous to the prosecutorial powers wielded by an independent
counsel.”335 Looming in the background for many justices must have

329 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-72 (1988) (discussing U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2).
330 Id. at 671-72.
331 Id. at 688-89, 692, 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
332 Id. at 689.
333 Id. at 690.
334 Id. at 691-92.
335 Id. at 691-92, 692 n.31.
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been the judgment that Congress’s motives were reasonable and even
laudable in light of the experiences of Watergate.
On the question whether the limits on the President’s supervision of
an inferior officer exercising purely executive functions violated the
separation of powers, the Court placed great weight on the fact that
Congress was not here trying to “increase its own powers at the
expense of the Executive Branch.”336 Framing the question as whether
the President’s power to execute the laws was “unduly interfer[ed]”
with by the Act, the Court answered no. High-level executive branch
superintendence was still available through the Attorney General, and
indirectly by the President via his authority over the Attorney
General.337
Justice Scalia’s famous dissent argued that “the conduct of a criminal
prosecution (and of an investigation to decide whether to prosecute)”
is an exercise of “purely” and “quintessentially executive activity.”338
(As noted above, this is historically incorrect with regard to criminal
investigation and, perhaps, prosecution also.) The President’s Article
II power and duty to execute the law could not be partially delegated
away by Congress, wrote Scalia — the President must have “all of the
executive power,” not “some of the executive power.”339
Scalia also warned against the dangers posed by prosecutors with
great resources being free from the political accountability. He thought
it particularly likely that, as structured, an independent counsel might
commit the great sin that Attorney General Jackson famously warned
against: picking a defendant first and then searching for legal
violations to charge, rather than neutrally looking at all legal
violations and choosing the only most important and deserving to
prosecute.340
The Court has decided only one other removal case since Morrison.
That decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, suggests greater formalism and commitment to
unitary control of the executive branch by the President than seen in
Morrison or Humphrey’s Executor, though the Court was careful to note
that it was not reconsidering those decisions.341 In brief, Free
Enterprise Fund involved the constitutionality of a double good-cause
336
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340 See Jackson, supra note 4, at 4-5.
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removal structure. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”), created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was an agency housed
within the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and given
law execution, rule-making, and adjudicate authorities.342 Members of
the Board governing PCAOB could only be removed by the SEC, and
only then for willful violations of law or unreasonable failure to carry
out Board duties.343 The litigating parties and the United States as
amicus curiae all assumed that, although SEC commissioners lack
statutory good-cause removal protection, the SEC was intended by
Congress to be independent of presidential control and hence that
good-cause removal restrictions should be implied.344 The Court
accepted that assumption.345
But this dual insulation from the President was fatal to the
constitutionality of the removal restrictions on the Board.346 The Court
stressed that the ability to remove subordinates was crucial to the
President’s constitutional duty to execute the laws.347 The dual goodcause structure prevented “[t]he President [from] hold[ing] the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission fully accountable for the
[Accounting] Board’s conduct [because he lacks] . . . the ability to
oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he
can oversee.”348 The majority scoffed at Justice Breyer’s suggestion in
dissent that there remained many practical means by which the SEC
could effectively supervise and control the Board, and that this was
sufficient to satisfy Article II’s requirements of presidential supervision
of law execution.349
Many commentators noticed the centrality the Free Enterprise Fund
Court gave to the removal power as the key to presidential law
execution power.350 Some have speculated that the majority was
planting the seeds for future cutting-back of the leeway given to
Congress by Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor.351
The constitutionality of for-cause removal protection for the FBI
Director is uncertain. If Morrison is good law, a functional approach
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351

Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
See id. at 485.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 527-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 300, at 1880.
Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1173.
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would be used, looking at whether the restriction unduly interfered
with the President’s authority to take care to faithfully execute the
laws. Since FBI Directors have operated for the last two generations
with very substantial independence from the White House,352 and few
major problems as a result, the answer might well be ‘no.’
But Morrison emphasized the independent counsel’s “limited
duties,” “limited in jurisdiction,” and “limited in tenure”353 in
upholding the removal restriction for an investigative and
prosecutorial official. By contrast, the FBI Director has broad and
important duties, a very wide jurisdiction, and (absent removal or
impeachment) a ten-year tenure. FBI Directors have enormous power
to do harm, and it could be argued that political accountability — via
the elected President’s removal ability — is essential to keeping that
power from being abused.
In addition, Morrison might no longer be good law. Important
scholars assert that it is not, and that Justice Scalia’s dissent has come
to represent the best view of the law.354 At the risk of being overly
reductionist, I think the major factor that has shifted opinions about
Morrison is not necessarily any increased sympathy for strict unitary
executive formalism, but rather the lived experience of Kenneth StarrWhitewater-Lewinsky, and other sprawling independent counsel
investigations that seemed to have made proverbial mountains out of
mole hills. Those experiences of Javert-like independent prosecutors
in the 1980s and 1990s have eclipsed the memory of Watergate and
the Saturday Night Massacre. Scalia’s warning about a prosecutor
divorced from political accountability came to seem prescient. That is
likely why Congress let the independent counsel statute lapse in 1999.
But new experiences under President Trump will also shape — and are
now shaping — the views of any judges who might decide in the
future on the constitutionality of a statutory restriction on removal of
the FBI Director. My guess is that the Trump experience will lead the
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nominal sense, Morrison is probably no longer good law. Indeed, the best
understanding is that it has long since become anticanonical.”).
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judiciary to be more tolerant of future congressional restrictions than
it might have been otherwise.
Congress might reduce concerns about an FBI Director being too
independent of the President by reducing the term of office from the
current ten years to something shorter, such as seven years — long
enough to allow a director to learn the agency and implement
programs and reforms, longer than any one presidential term, and an
odd number of years so that an opening will be unlikely to coincide
with a presidential election.
CONCLUSION
The options presented above are meant to be a menu to choose from
à la carte, not a comprehensive program. Reasonable people can differ
about what, if anything, Congress should do to bolster norms of law
enforcement independence and neutrality that President Trump has
assailed. Having spent a fair amount of time examining debates about
this issue from the 1970s through the present, I thought I would close
by suggesting what measures I think would be useful:
•

A pledge by the Senate that it will not approve nominees for
FBI Director unless they make specific commitments on the
record that they have been promised investigative
independence by the President and Attorney General, and that
they would reject as improper any attempts by the White
House to interfere with FBI functions;

•

Congressional hearings and GAO investigation on whether the
DOJ and FBI have improperly re-initiated criminally
investigating Hillary Clinton or otherwise acted on improper
partisan motives during the Trump administration;

•

Serious consideration of censuring or impeaching President
Trump for obstructing justice in connection with the
investigations of Michael Flynn, connections between Russia
and the Trump campaign, and the firing of FBI Director
Comey;

•

A statutory directive that the Attorney General promulgate
regulations on White House-DOJ contacts that ensure, as far as
possible, impartiality and independence of law enforcement;

•

Added duties for the DOJ Inspector General to investigate
politicization of the Department;
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•

Statutory clarification that anyone serving as acting Attorney
General must have previously been Senate-confirmed;

•

A statutory requirement that the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, U.S. Attorneys, and FBI Director have
demonstrated “integrity, impartiality, and good judgment”;

•

A statutory requirement that the FBI Director and perhaps U.S.
Attorneys also be appointed “without regard to political
affiliation”;

•

A statutory requirement embodying something similar to the
Bentsen amendment — barring political campaign aides and
cronies of the President from serving as Attorney General or
FBI Director; and

•

A statutory requirement that the President may not remove the
FBI Director from office except for “good cause,” and shall
transmit in writing a description of the good cause to House
and Senate leaders within forty-eight hours, combined with
reducing the term of office from ten to seven years.

The normative desirability of some of these proposals, such as the
removal restrictions for the FBI Director, turn on complex judgments
about law, politics, and policy.355 As I said, reasonable people can
differ on whether these or other measures by Congress would be
advantageous. But I would hope there would be broad consensus that
the independence and neutrality of federal law enforcement are values
worth preserving, and that Congress should play a central role in
articulating and protecting those values.

355 See, e.g., Robert Litt, FBI Independence — Too Much of a Good Thing?, LAWFARE
(July 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), www.lawfareblog.com/fbi-independence%E2%80%94toomuch-good-thing (former general counsel for the Director of National Intelligence
criticizing an article in which I raised the possibility of removal restrictions for the FBI
Director). For my (brief) response, see Andrew Kent, FBI Independence: Some Thoughts
in Response to Robert Litt, LAWFARE (July 18, 2017, 1:30 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/
fbi-independence-some-thoughts-response-robert-litt.

